Graham Priest's new book is about things being about things—about what it is for things which are about things, such as beliefs, hopes and fears, and the like, and sentences which express them, to be about the things they are about, and about the range of things about which things which are about are about—in a word, intentionality. It has two principal objectives—to develop a formal semantics for intentionality, and to promote and defend a philosophical thesis about what exists and what does not. The semantics proposed is an extension of the familiar ‘world’1 semantics for modal logic. The philosophical thesis asserts that while some things exist, not everything does, or equivalently that while some things exist, some others do not. Priest, following Richard Routley (later Sylvan), calls this Noneism to mark the divergence from Meinong's view, with which, nevertheless, it has a good deal in common. Meinong likewise...

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