Kalderon argues that moral fictionalism is the most promising position in meta‐ethics, since it captures what is attractive about both realism and non‐cognitivism. In ch. 1 he argues that there are good reasons to accept non‐cognitivism, and in ch. 2 that there are good reasons to reject non‐factualism, the view that the content of a moral sentence does not consist in any moral proposition expressed, for it expresses none. In the rest of the book he attempts to show, first, that combining non‐cognitivism and factualism does not create a dilemma; secondly, that in recognizing this, a new and attractive position presents itself – moral fictionalism.

Like other forms of non‐cognitivism, moral fictionalism holds that in accepting a moral sentence one is not forming a belief, and that when one utters a moral sentence one is not asserting. Like other forms of factualism, moral fictionalism holds that moral sentences still express...

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