In this entertaining and thought‐provoking book, Merricks argues against the claim that truth depends in any substantial way upon the world. Negative existentials, tensed facts, modal truths, subjunctive conditionals – all of these are true just because what they say is the case: there is no portion of what there is that these truths correspond to and obtain in virtue of.

The style of argument is familiar: we are confronted with certain kinds of proposition, and told that the best case for a truthmaker for propositions of those kinds is as such and such; then it is argued that the price of admitting such and such into one's ontology as truthmakers is too great. But while the general strategy is familiar, Merricks' particular arguments are interesting and provocative; and this lively discussion should be of interest to anyone interested in ontology.

Merricks argues...

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