In Pascal's Wager, Jordan defends a version of Pascal's famous argument (1670) that it is rational to believe, or to try to induce belief, in God. Most discussions of the wager concentrate on what Jordan calls the ‘canonical’ version, according to which one should cultivate religious belief because of the possibility of an infinite reward which, even if it is discounted by allowing only a tiny probability that God exists, swamps any expectation derived from earthly pleasures. Jordan rejects this argument in favour of what he calls the ‘Jamesian’ version. The Jamesian wager, which requires only finite utilities, is essentially a dominance argument: religious belief yields higher utility than atheism (or agnosticism) whether or not God exists. Jordan's stated objective is to establish the viability of the Jamesian wager, but in some ways his more important philosophical point is that a Jamesian...

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