Disagreement and Skepticism

Extract

To a first approximation, a disagreement is a case in which at least one individual believes that p and at least one individual believes that not-p; and a pair of individuals are one another's peers, with respect to whether p, when and only when they have available to them the same evidence whether p and they possess equivalent epistemic virtues. Suppose that one is involved in a peer dispute. What responses are rationally permitted or required?

According to one version of what is known as the Equal Weight View, if one believes that one is involved in such a peer dispute, one is rationally required to give equal weight to (what one knows or believes to be) any of the disputed beliefs that one lacks independent reason to discount. For example, if one believes that p, one knows that one's peer believes that not-p, and one's only reason for discounting their belief is one's own belief that p, then one is rationally required to suspend that belief. One question discussed in the collection is whether one or another form of the View is correct. Another concerns what would follow from endorsing the View. Would its acceptance, combined with the prevalence of disagreement in various domains of inquiry, lead to one or another form of scepticism?