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Takuo Sugaya, Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 89, Issue 4, July 2022, Pages 2201–2256, https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab079
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Abstract
We show that the folk theorem holds generically for the repeated two-player game with private monitoring if the support of each player’s signal distribution is sufficiently large. Neither cheap talk communication nor public randomization is necessary.
© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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