‘No Man’s Land’: Disability, Rehabilitation, Welfare Policy and the British Ex-Service Migrant in Australia, 1918–39

Summary An inter-war analysis of the British and Australian departments charged with compensating disabled First World War veterans and the British ex-service migrant in inter-war Australia illustrates how nation-states have failed to unify welfare and disability rehabilitation. Contemporary welfare states continue to codify and establish categories of prioritisation regarding communities with disabilities for public finance administered by national government departments. This binational case study identifies reoccurring type one and type two error problems: policy can deny legitimate claims for state assistance while also validating and financing potentially illegitimate claims. This underlines the factors that dictate which error type is ruled to be the least significant and the impact the resulting model has on individual claimants. This study reinforces the thesis of David Gerber who stresses the ahistorical centrality of ‘biopolitics’ or the relationship between societal and political perceptions of a conflict on state policy, in the treatment of veteran communities.

Australia, this study enters the historiographical debate on the value of the Commission, siding with Alistair Thomson, Clem Lloyd and Jacquie Rees who have emphasised its liberality as opposed to Kate Blackmore who advances a bleaker view of the Department underlining its austere public economy. 14 Ultimately, public health, rehabilitation and welfare policy in both countries remains fluid, being shaped by the socio-economic, political and cultural national context in which public policy was devised and implemented. 15 The Ministry of Pensions and Repatriation Commission and the Ministry's First Tour of Australia, 1916-29 Before the First World War, both Britain and Australia provided charity relief funds to returning veterans of colonial conflicts with limited state liability to assist those disabled by war service. 16 The lethal reality of the industrialised nature of the First World War wounded and disabled mass citizen armies on an unprecedented scale. The Ministry of Pensions was established in 1916 in the UK to provide financial remuneration, employment training and medical treatment to disabled ex-servicemen. The department compensated disabled veterans depending on the severity of their disability. Pensions ranged from 20 per cent awards for the loss of one finger on each hand to 100 per cent pension for the loss of two or more limbs. 17 The Ministry also provided exclusive rehabilitative and medical treatment for the Great War pensioner. Ministry intervention was at its zenith in 1921 with almost 1,200,000 ex-service pensioners. Segregated hospitals operating throughout Britain and Ireland offered nearly 150,000 veterans specialist in-patient and out-patient treatment for a range of war-related conditions such as limb loss, neurasthenia and orthopaedic surgery. 18 Influenced by Britain's establishment of the Ministry, Australia followed suit with the founding of its Repatriation Commission in 1917. 19 By 1920, 90,000 veterans of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) were receiving a war pension across the six states of Australia. 20 The Government Treasury again funded the Commission, remained bound by statutes and regulations, with a centralised headquarters, regional officials and medical officers working on behalf of the Department across the country. The department also administered medical care to disabled veterans via specialised and exclusive departmental in-patient and out-patient faculties specific to ex-servicemen ( Figure 1).
The Australian Repatriation Commission also shared the British Ministry of Pensions' emphasis on the importance of employment in the rehabilitation of disabled veterans, and of incorporating societal initiatives in the latter. 22 The two departments were not, however, identical. With provision in Australia being much sparser than in Britain, the Repatriation Commission made more use of associated medical officers interacting with disabled veterans on their behalf. 23 Reflecting the Repatriation's emphasis on egalitarianism, the Australian level of disability pension started at a base rate of 5 per cent as opposed to Britain's preferred 20 per cent. Whereas in Britain the Officer and non-officer class were paid on different scales, Australia had no such class distinctions built into its structure. 24 In addition to catering for its domestic veteran populations, British and Australian migrants were also rehabilitated and compensated. While the welfare authorities of the migrant's new host society administered payment and treatment, only their country of origin could approve of new pension awards. The Ministry had a special branch, located at departmental headquarters in London, dedicated to 'overseas' cases. The exception here was Canada. Due to the large concentration of around 11,500 pensioners in Canada and the USA, an individual Ministry representative and office was established in Ottawa. The Ministry appeared satisfied with its transnational remit writing: 'Every effort has been made to ensure that a pensioner abroad has available to him all the medical skill and care of the country in which he is resident'. 25 Australian authorities also continued to care for their overseas veteran communities. Australia House in London housed Australia's headquarters for its overseas migrant population. By 1927, there were 9,000 AIF veterans located across the world at an annual cost to the Australian department of over £311,000. 26 In 1918, Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes welcomed the participation of British Army veterans in Australian settlements, proclaiming it as a 'unique opportunity of securing the right type of immigrant' from British ex-servicemen 'in the prime of life, who would make most desirable settlers on soil'. 27 Nevertheless, veterans in receipt of a disability pension were expected to be amongst the ex-service population who migrated via free passage migration as it was publicised in pensioner newspapers. 28 The British Legion also provided guidelines to pensioners to ensure that their pension was transferred to be paid overseas before their arrival. 29 Some disabled men, however, were ineligible due to their perceived ailments. Others were able to proceed to Australia regardless of their disability on the assumption that their war wound/s had reached a permanent and manageable status. A third category, noted later in the essay, was made up of those migrants whose disability only became apparent after their arrival in Australia. 30 With regards to those who migrated already classified as disabled, imperial research into immigration screening has a rich secondary literature. 31 The nature of medical screening of British exservice migrants to inter-war Australia is, nevertheless, challenging to quantify. Each state had its own medical screening standards, involving hundreds of thousands of applicants, thousands of migration officials and fluctuating state regulations that kept their policy confidential. 32 Bureaucracy and enquiries regarding suitability were reduced for self-funders. The number of British ex-servicemen who migrated via this method is unknown although Australian officials estimated that the majority of British migrants were self-funders who were not properly vetted before arrival. 33 While the process of screening ex-service migrants appears convoluted and inconsistent, the arrival of unfit migrants ensured complaints from Australians. 34 A search of the Australian newspaper archive reveals numerous articles dedicated to British ex-service migrants involved in instances of crime, mental illness and hospitalisation, and letters to the editor complaining as to their costly impact 25 Nineteenth Out of 133,301 applications forwarded on behalf of ex-servicemen wishing to migrate to imperial territories overseas, less than one-third were accepted as suitable by overseas governments, with emphasis placed on the likelihood that a migrant would become self-reliant and employable post-passage; Plant, Overseas Settlement, 73.
to Australian society. 35 These concerns seemingly reflected wider concerns that Empire Settlement was Britain's attempt at 'pauper shovelling'. 36 The surge of supposedly unfit ex-servicemen migrating to the Dominions, who subsequently became an alleged burden on Australian society, was cited as a key reason to relieve Australian state officials of this increased liability. 37 British ex-servicemen residing in Australia were previously cared for via Australian State Treasurers who arranged for the payment and treatment of British veterans. 38 In early 1921, a Ministry official, Cecil Floersheim, visited Australia to report on transferring administrative responsibility to Australian Repatriation authorities. Both Floersheim and Repatriation officials recommended a transfer citing the long delays and confusion regarding correspondence between officials in London and Australia. 39 P. F. Aitken, the Ministry official who headed the administration of 'overseas' cases from London, advocated passing complete jurisdiction over the British ex-service migrant to the Repatriation. 40 Ian Macpherson MP, the British Government's Minister of Pensions, dismissed Aitken's suggestion believing that British pensioners should be treated equally regardless of location. Tellingly, Macpherson also held the Australian administration to be too liberal and costly. Therefore, the British Treasury would have strong objections to providing Australian authorities with the unsupervised power to distribute its capital. 41 This stance was agreed upon by Adair Hore, one of the leading officials within the Ministry, who told Aitken that the Ministry had to avoid giving 'carte blanche' to Australian authorities in distributing Ministry funding. 42 Hore maintained that the Treasury would never agree to pass complete control to the Commission as it was impossible to provide accurate estimates as to future costs. 43 The process of the Commission acting as an agent on behalf of the Ministry and vice versa was nevertheless completed by 1923. 44 Hore recognised that Repatriation officials believed the Ministry's rules to be 'excessively restrictive'. 45 Summarising their supposed fundamental differences, A. Skerman, both a Repatriation official and its official historian, held that Australia accepted all financial and legal responsibility for its disabled ex-servicemen regardless of the existing economic context. In contrast, the national economy and the availability of finances shaped British policy. large emphasis on social bonds and philanthropic bodies to help reintegrate British veterans back into the society. 46 One prominent scheme was the King's National Roll, a state programme that encouraged employers to ensure at least 5 per cent of their workforce were ex-servicemen in receipt of a disability pension. Launched in Britain in September 1919, employers who participated were included on a national 'Roll of Honour' able to use the King's Seal in correspondence. Previous research into the scheme highlights its worthiness as almost 24,000 employers participated in helping 259,000 disabled ex-servicemen attain employment in 1921. Such an effort helped to create a national sense of duty and appreciation to the disabled ex-service population. 47 There was an increased potency of ex-service lobbyists and in the political capital associated with veteran issues in Australia. 48 Researchers have attributed the increased liberalisation of the Repatriation Commission to the 'Anzac Legend', which was a widespread perception that the Australian Imperial Force's sacrifices during the Great War gave birth to the nation of Australia. 49 The Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial League of Australia (RSSILA) became an 'effective champion' on behalf of the Australian veteran due to its lobbying, campaigning and personal assistance in furnishing claims and employment by repeatedly using notions of the 'Anzac Legend' to its advantage. 50 Differences between the British and Australian schemes became further magnified with the UK's implementation of the 'Geddes' Axe', which enforced a host of tax increases and economic cutbacks across the UK public sector from 1921 onwards. 51 The cutbacks were a primary reason for the restriction of government assistance in Empire Settlement. 52 The British Treasury wrote to all pensions departments urging austere economic policies throughout the department. The War Pensions Act of 1921 ushered in a subsequent period of restrictions to the Ministry's policy and procedure in Britain. Overall spending for the department was reduced by almost 50 per cent from £106,367,000 in 1921 to £54,066,000 in 1930. This reduction was achieved in numerous ways. By 1925, almost half a million pensioners, with around 50 per cent of those in receipt of a pension scaled at 20 per cent or less, were given a lump sum or gratuity defined as a 'Final Award'. There was a subsequent reduction in medical facilities: while 332,000 disabled pensioners were undergoing treatment in 1921, this figure stood at just 41,000 by 1930. The Ministry then often covered the cost of a veteran's health care via capitation grants for treatment in public hospitals or via their personal General Practitioners. 53 A subsequent associated reduction in Ministry staff resulted in 21,685 departmental staff in 1921 being reduced to just 3,795 a decade later. 54 This reduction in Ministry liability and state intervention was seemingly aided by the lessening in societal concern for the disabled First World War veteran as the British population became desensitised to their plight in a time of widespread austerity and employment scarcity. 55 The Ministry's 1921 legislation further restricted the potential for future state liability by introducing a 7-year time limit on claims from discharge or the end of the war. 56 This position was not mere draconian penny-pinching. Both the BESL and even the Ex-Service Welfare Society, an otherwise staunch advocate on behalf of the mentally ill veteran in Britain, conceded the difficulty in tracing the relationship between war service and ill health over more than a decade. 57 The British Treasury was fearful of being burdened by the financial consequences of non-war-related ill health or the burden of ageing veterans. 58 The Ministry, Parliament and Ministry of National Service were acutely aware of the apparent abuses within the American Civil War pensions system. 59 The liberal American system became, to all intents and purposes, an old-age pension. By 1914, 93 per cent of Union veterans, nearly 400,000 men, received a state pension for a war-related disability. 60 The Australian department saw things differently citing the differences in 'basic principles governing the provision' of the Australian and British systems: It might be said that the Australian ex-soldier is offered every facility to establish his claim for the necessary facility to establish his claim for the necessary treatment, whereas the British man has to prove his right to treatment and is not helped to the same extent by the Ministry. 61 These contrasting standards of principle, in the opinion of one Repatriation official, explained why the relative cost of pensioners receiving treatment in Australia was much 53 The subsequent annual outlay of medical costs was subsequently reduced from £15,000,000 to £1,600,000; Nineteenth Annual Report of the MoP higher than the UK. 62 The comparative generosity of the Commission to the Ministry was also repeated in the Australian House of Representatives. 63 J. M. Shemmens, Chairman of the Repatriation Commission, criticised his British counterparts and their 'definite steps to limit its post-war expenditure', writing: 'the British Ministry is definitely illiberal', paraphrasing the Ministry's alleged mission as 'getting the patient off our hands as soon as possible'. Shemmens praised the Commission's treatment of Australian veterans, which had been backed by successive federal governments, concluding: 'the comparison between the two administrations may be reduced to this: the Repatriation Commission "cares" for its patients the British Ministry of Pensions does not'. 64 Such simplistic and moralistic conclusions are complicated, however, by considering the resulting impact that Australian welfare legislation had on national expenditure. The Commission and its Chairman, for example, accepted that it was impossible for its associated medico-pensions official to decipher whether a fresh disability claim made years after discharge was war-induced. 65 The Commission noted the unexpected peak of fresh claims in 1927 where the chances of success still appeared stacked in the Australian veteran claimants' favour, with just 2,518 rejections out of 13,323 new claims. Reviewing the year, the department conceded that the 'exceedingly liberal' remit of its welfare policy, shaped by the 'expressed desire' of successive governments to make sure veteran welfare was 'interpreted in the most generous manner', explained the subsequent acceptance of state liability. The absence of any time limit was critical in the increased claims for state assistance. In contrast, the Commission pinpointed the British Ministry's 7-year time limit as the fundamental factor in its comparatively reduced financial outlay the same year. 66 The BESL protested against the Ministry's 7-year time limit on British claims believing it to be prejudicial against its ex-servicemen in acquiring fair recompense for war-related disability. 67 It was within this context that the Ministry's first tour of Imperial Pensioners in Australia occurred. An analysis of the department's resulting report reveals the nuanced situation regarding state responses to post-conflict disability and rehabilitation.
Between 1925 and 1926, following an audit of administration carried out on behalf of the Ministry in North America, G. F. Gilbert, a senior official in the Ministry's accounting department in London, visited India, imperial territories in British Africa, Australia and New Zealand. 68 In Australia, Gilbert met associated Repatriation officials, Medical Advisory Committees, Departmental Medical and Pension Officers, the Managers of Artificial Limb Factories and members of various ex-service associations. Gilbert also visited four Repatriation Hospitals, four exclusive Sanatoriums, one state mental institution 62 Ibid. and two Anzac Hospitals. 69 As is often the case with disabled communities, the majority of Imperial Pensioners lived outside of medical institutions. 70 Most Imperial Pensioner cases appear to have been of disease and illness such as bronchitis, tuberculosis, heart problems and psychoneurotic ailments (Table 1). The provision of treatment generally constituted Imperial Pensioners attending a Repatriation Commission out-patient clinic twice a month for a supply of alleviating medicines. 71 Gilbert estimated that there were 651 Imperial pensioners receiving treatment. Just over a third were receiving in-patient treatment, half via out-patient care and 15 per cent via associated medical officers: As an auditor, Gilbert's primary function was to emphasise Ministry instructions and conditions to Repatriation officials. In total, the annual outlay paid for by the Ministry amounted to £255,000. 73 Gilbert reserved praise for the Branch Offices in New South Wales and Queensland, with issues involving Imperial Pensioners devolved to one or two staff members. 74 Gilbert, however, also noted a widespread lack of coordination of understanding between Repatriation Branches and Ministry officials, which came at a financial cost to the Ministry. Gilbert concluded that his explanation of Ministry regulations would enable a better understanding of British policy and account for a reduction totalling £1,000 per year. 75 Gilbert denied any venture that would allow the Repatriation Commission to incorporate and categorise Imperial Pensioners as disabled Australian veterans with the Ministry covering the bill. 76 Gilbert's report also devoted considerable attention to the functioning and remit of Repatriation staff infrastructure. These observations underline the contrasting remit and functions of British and Australian infrastructures.
Gilbert would also recognise the comparative liberality of the Commission. When discussing Repatriation medico-pensions officials examining veterans suffering from Ibid.

74
It appears that the specialisation of Repatriation officials was dictated by population sizes; of 3,236 pensions paid to Imperial Pensioners, nearly one half were in New South Wales; Ibid.
'No Man's Land' tuberculosis, he wrote that they largely attributed their condition to war service with little concern if it was induced by active service: "The Committee certainly give the benefit of the doubt to the applicant. In fact, I do not think it would be unjust to them to say they generally spend some time looking for the 'shadow of doubt". Gilbert referenced further legislative differences between Ministry and Repatriation policy, including the aforementioned lack of time limits and final awards. 77 Gilbert cited the Australian socio-political context to explain the existing benevolence: This liberality was born of the spontaneous sympathy and generous impulses of the Australian people, but I am afraid that it is now kept alive and fostered by the exigencies of politics. The political element apparently enters far more into pension matters in Australia than in Great Britain. 78 Further distinctive political infrastructure in Australia improved the ex-serviceman's position. While there was a Federal Parliament for the whole of Australia, each state had its own Parliament. This increased regionalism and democratisation gave ex-service bodies more political leverage: Every member of the Parliament deemed it his duty to obtain as much as possible for his constituents, irrespective of whether they were entitled to it or not. There is no doubt, also, that the Associations of ex-servicemen are able to exert far more pressure in the Commonwealth than in Great Britain. 79 Gilbert interacted with a small number of Imperial Pensioners receiving in-patient treatment at Repatriation facilities. They declared their contentedness and comfort in the facilities provided. Included within Repatriation medical infrastructure, for example, were sanatoriums and mental hospitals reserved for tubercular and insane ex-servicemen, respectively. Such segregation of insane ex-servicemen supposedly spared them from the stigma of hereditary and degenerative mental illness. 80 On visiting one such facility in Victoria, which housed three Imperial Pensioners, Gilbert noted the 'lavish provision made for the comforts of the patients, the appointments being really suggestive of a first class hotel'. 81 By comparison, ex-servicemen in Britain suffering from tuberculosis and insanity shared public facilities with the wider population. With regard to the latter, previous research has foregrounded the austere and highly stigmatised asylums that became associated with Great War veterans. 82 Australian treatment did not always surpass comparative treatment available in Britain. The British Legion, medico-military staff and contemporary historians have assessed that the British metal leg limb was superior regarding durability and flexibility in comparison 77 Ibid.

79
Ibid. to the wooden limb favoured in Australia. 83 On visiting five artificial limb manufacturing sites across Australia, Gilbert wrote that the artificial limbs constructed and distributed were of an inferior wooden variety. While the number of limbless Imperial Pensioners in Australia was unknown, 12 were provided with Australian-made limbs in the year before Gilbert's tour. 84 Writing about the Imperial Pensioner overseas, the Ministry held 'every effort has been made to ensure a pensioner abroad has available to him all the medical skill and care of the country in which he is resident'. 85 A case study of the Imperial Pensioner in Australia and their allocation of in-patient facilities and artificial limbs thus highlights the dangers of offering a universal illustration of national responses to disability. The treatment of a disabled British veteran depended on their diagnosis. While the insane Imperial Pensioner received superior treatment in Australia compared to their similarly afflicted former comrade who remained in Britain, the opposite appears true regarding those with artificial legs.
The crucial role of the family and philanthropic lobbyist also needs to be highlighted. Even when Australian in-patient facilities were superior to what was otherwise available in Britain, British ex-service migrants did not always benefit from these because of the absence of a family member or an ex-service association submitting a claim to the Ministry on their behalf. Some British ex-service migrants were treated in highly stigmatised and overcrowded public asylums overseas as pauper lunatics, with no recognition of their former war service. 86 Further national policy divergences arose between the British Ministry of Pensions and the Australian Repatriation Commission in the 1930s, which increased discontent amongst the British ex-service migrants residing in Australia.

Increased National Policy Divergence and the
Ministry's Second Tour, 1930-39 In contrast to the Ministry's extensive reduction of exclusive medical facilities, funding for veteran medical facilities continued in Australia into the late 1930s, including extensive renovation in comforts and medical equipment throughout the country and the establishment of modernised out-patient facilities. 87 Australian wooden prosthetics, however, continued to be inferior to the metal devices available to ex-servicemen who remained in Britain. 88  welfare policy regarding AIF veterans during the 1930s. 89 Seemingly taking the lead from Canada, and having been previously discussed and promoted by the BESL, the Repatriation Commission responded to public and political lobbying on behalf of the Australian veteran to introduce the so-called 'Burnt Out Digger' legislation. 90 This measure aimed to facilitate Australian veterans who had hitherto not applied or had been rejected for relief or assistance. Repatriation concessions included providing a pension to previously uncompensated veterans who reached the age of 60 years, as well as making eligible those who had proven to be permanently unemployable and easing the success rate of tubercular claims. The latter was particularly aimed at those servicemen who had been gassed during the war, and whose disability was believed to have been due to the deleterious and long-term impact of war service on reducing a veteran's immune system, ensuring their supposed susceptibility to contracting diseases such as tuberculosis. From 1936, the Commission allowed any tubercular ex-servicemen to receive a pension and medical treatment regardless of the war's perceived attributability. 91 The British Treasury and Ministry, in contrast, rejected identical lobbying on behalf of what the British termed as the 'prematurely-aged ex-serviceman' due to its 7-year time limit on claims. Despite the British Legion persistently agitating for the removal of the time limit, which included a deputation with the Minister of Pensions F. O. Roberts in June 1927, and associated medical conferences and articles, new claims were very rarely accepted in the late 1920s and 1930s. 92 Repeated questions from MPs to the Minister of Pensions in the House of Commons were similarly rebuffed. 93 The perceived draconian nature of the time limit led the British Legion in 1933 to describe the Ministry as using 'medieval methods' in its dealings with claimant ex-servicemen. 94 The Ministry countered that its limited time response to progressive ailments was a necessary 'cornerstone' of British policy: Evidence has always, therefore, been essential . . . in the reliance of this evidence, the Ministry have been able to resist the occasional demand that a definite presumption of war should be embodied in Warrant or legislation.
Tellingly, the Ministry cited that the Repatriation Commission 'have to their disadvantage, in the absence of precisely this evidence, been driven to adopt'. 95 The Ministry went so far as to argue that the awarding of maximum pensions for tuberculosis in the Australian scheme was actually 'prejudiced' against the state and the public purse. 96 Repatriation concessions had their detractors in both Britain and Australia. Writing to the Auditor General of the Melbourne state government, Gilbert wrote in 1934: 'I certainly share your views that there is too much economic waste and extravagance in the commonwealth'. 97 The political potency of the Australian veteran bloc was again cited as the fundamental explanation to such concessions: As you say, the members of the Commonwealth parliament seem to be more keen on catching votes than on conserving the resources of the country, and the government certainly gives way to them much more readily than our government does. 98 Historians who have analysed the efforts of the Repatriation Commission also suggest that the department may have underestimated the potential for abuse its liberal infrastructure allowed. 99 Gilbert Dyett, Dominion President of the BESL, nevertheless, pressed Britain to follow the example of Australia and Canada and introduce equivalent legislation to assist fresh claims at a BESL conference in 1937. 100 By way of a response, Harwald Ramsbotham MP, the Minister of Pensions, stated: 'The British pensions system was, on the whole, the best in the world'. Ramsbotham justified the efforts of successive British governments to keep pensions out of politics and to deny the Ministry from becoming entangled with wider social unemployment and public ill health, which ensured the efficiency of the British system. Ramsbotham felt such measures were increasingly necessary during a period of high financial debt. 101 At a BESL conference, 3 years earlier, Sir Ian Fraser MP similarly advocated for the prioritisation of the national economy arguing: 'ex-servicemen could not prosper unless their country prospered'. 102 These contrasting welfare models had significant economic repercussions. While the financial outlay of the Ministry had been reduced by almost 51 per cent between 1921 and 1930, Repatriation costs increased by 25 per cent during the same period. 103 A simultaneous financial trajectory of the Ministry and Commission highlights the former's reduction in costs juxtaposed with Australia's increase in expenditure ( Figure 2   Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia. Repatriation authorities and Imperial Pensioners were even unaware of the right to appeal a 'Final Award' that had lapsed unless substantial new medical evidence had arisen or were aware that the Ministry had a 7-year time limit on claims. 113 Smith heard repeated criticisms of the treatment of British migrants throughout his tour by Commission officials, charity workers and British migrants alike. Smith reasoned 'the Imperial in Australia, without effective local representation from the Ministry, felt himself to be neglected by his own government and treated with a lack of sympathy and inadequate knowledge by the country of his adoption'. 114 Smith countered during numerous personal meetings with Repatriation officials that any problems were the result of a 'lack of authoritative information rather than any serious defects in the system'. 115 There was a widespread feeling amongst Britons that it was impossible 'to get beyond the agents' and communicate directly with the Ministry who were unable, rather than unwilling, to intervene. 116 One British migrant, who had unsuccessfully submitted a pension claim through the Repatriation Commission, told Smith: 'Frankly I do not believe the Ministry of Pensions gave such a decision'. The migrant sardonically joked that his claim was cast aside by the 'Repudiation Department' without reference to the Ministry. 117 Ignorance of British regulations regarding time limits ensured that large amounts of medical documentation submitted to the Ministry on behalf of the British ex-service migrant were often incomplete, incorrect and ineligible. The unverifiable nature of many claims, requests and forwarded documentation ensured that many were 'often utterly useless' and destined for rejection. 118 Smith thus held that the establishment of a departmental branch in Australia would only serve to give false hope to British migrants whose ineligible and inadequate claims for relief and rehabilitation were fated for failure. 119 Migrant ex-servicemen in Australia were further hampered by their isolation. Empathetic judgements appear increasingly unlikely if claims were based only on paperwork as opposed to personal testimony. 120 British settlers in Australia were disadvantaged in this regard as they could only personally attend a hearing if they financed and arranged their return to Britain. 121 In his analysis of veterans of twentieth-century conflicts, Niel Diamant comments that ex-servicemen fared better if they were able to organise autonomously or semi-autonomously. 122 Unlike their former ex-comrades who remained in Britain, British migrants did not benefit equally from the support of the British Legion who assisted veterans in Britain with employment schemes, charitable donations, training opportunities, employment, pension claims, and information on issues such as limb fitting. 123 Even when Australian ex-service associations endeavoured to assist British exservice migrants, officials and charity workers did not have access to the personal files of claimants. 124 There was, in contrast, an opportunity for Australian veterans residing in Britain to have their case heard in person by Australian officials at Australia House in London. 125 Even with valid claims, the distance from Ministry officials in London caused substantial delay in communication and gaining approval. A period of 12 months was the average for an official decision on a claimant's response. 126 The laborious administration could delay much needed medical treatment. One Imperial Pensioner was receiving emergency medical treatment at a Repatriation Hospital in Victoria for a gunshot wound. Still awaiting a decision from the Ministry, he was forced to finance his in-patient treatment personally. 127 Recognising these lengthy delays, the Ministry accepted Smith's two primary recommendations. Firstly, for the increased use of airmail when transferring correspondence between Australia and Ministry headquarters in London. Secondly, they agreed to the increased distribution of the British Legion's Great War Pensions (1924) booklet to provide clear and concise information regarding Ministry policy. 128 A council of ex-service charity workers in Melbourne held that most of the dissatisfied applicants amongst the British ex-service migrant population were those who had sought assistance only when their health had broken down after their arrival in Australia. 129 Smith similarly conceded: 'In so many cases there has been consequent distress despite a heroic struggle, during which health may have been failing'. 130 One constant feature in disability and welfare studies has been the apparent correlation between unemployment, poverty and claims for relief. 131 In post-war Britain, medico-pensions officials repeatedly attested to the correlation between unemployment and subsequent claims for pensions amongst psychoneurotic pensioners. 132 AIF ex-servicemen's claims for relief similarly Disability and relief claims were, for example, evident amongst struggling British migrants who attempted to settle in the mining districts of New South Wales. 134 Repatriation officials in Perth and ex-service charities in Brisbane also relayed to Smith that the majority of Ministry claims were fresh appeals from destitute British exservicemen during the widespread economic depression that affected the Australian economy in the 1930s. 135 Oral testimonies of Australian men and women recounting their experiences of living in Australia during the economically depressed 1930s cite personal anecdotes of ex-servicemen's mental state being worsened by their unemployment, even driving some to commit suicide. 136 British settlers shared the fate of Australian ex-servicemen whose health was detrimentally affected by working on failing land settlements. 137 Smith visited some settlements in Western Australia and described the depressing conditions experienced by British settlers: 'It required no expert eye to realise that some of the propositions offered were, to say the least, impracticable; and the conditions under which some of the settlers were still living were terribly primitive'. 138 In November 1934, breaking off from its conference in Melbourne, BESL delegates also toured nearby land settlements shared by British and Australian ex-servicemen. Describing the dire and isolated conditions of the remaining farms, the charity vowed to provide more help to those involved: 'The world was beginning to forget the ex-serviceman, but they had a duty to the living as well as to the dead'. 139 Oral testimonies provided in the early 1990s by the children of British ex-servicemen who attempted land settlement similarly attest to the desperate and isolated conditions of migrants and their families during the depression, and the increased anxiety and mental strain induced on them as a result of these unfortunate circumstances. 140 Writing to the House of Commons in Britain, one newly formed association of British ex-service settlers in Victoria pleaded for British governmental assistance. Describing the settlement schemes as 'a hollow sham', many British ex-servicemen were claimed to be 'in a state of dire poverty and want . . . Settlers soon abandoned holdings to avoid starvation, while departments looked on and did nothing'. Both the Secretary of State for 133 Smith was relayed the same information Dominion Affairs and the Commonwealth Treasurer proved unwilling to intervene on behalf of the British migrant responding that any complaints were to be addressed to the relevant Australian authorities. 141 The British Government's non-intervention to relieve these communities echoed wider Imperial policy with the British Government repeatedly reluctant to provide any form of after-care for migrants in Australia. 142 In comparison to the disabled Australian veteran, the RSSILA also seemingly provided little in the way of intervention on behalf of the veteran British migrant who settled on the land. 143 The dire and isolated position which many ex-service migrants found themselves is highlighted by the deaths of ex-servicemen who died in destitute circumstances and were buried in pauper graves. Unless the migrant's death was related to a pensionable ailment, the Ministry proved unwilling to cover funeral and burial expenses, sparing the deceased veteran this shame. 144 Australia, in contrast, used public donations for its 'Last Post' scheme, which financed the burial of ex-servicemen regardless of their welfare status. 145 While no overall national numbers are cited, the RSSILA in Western Australia estimated around 50 such instances would arise in the state involving British veterans during the year of Smith's visit, articulating their indignation at the Ministry's inactivity. Smith had sympathy for this outrage while holding little hope the Ministry would adjust its position. 146 Previous research has described the Australian inter-war infrastructure as being 'truly exceptional' in its treatment of its ex-servicemen, even benefiting those who had not suffered considerably due to their war service and those affluent enough to be financially secure without additional government entitlements. This 'welfare apartheid' would ensure sporadic resentment aimed at ex-servicemen from the non-veteran communities. 147 The British migrant seemingly shared this discontent with many non-veteran contemporaries in their host society.
Smith conceded the administration of rehabilitation by the Ministry in Australia was not as 'all embracing' as that which the Commission afforded its ex-service population. 148 Smith recognised that comparisons were inevitable and could magnify the British ex-serviceman's sense of injustice. 149  Britain and Australia intensified bitterness. In a letter to his local Repatriation Branch, Imperial Pensioner, P. E. Causwick articulated his resentment at the reduced purchasing power of British pensions for those living in Australia. Seemingly struggling to afford necessary items such as food, drink and rent, Causwick complained that 'the question of subsequent migration of ex-servicemen to Australia was not allowed for'. 151 This negative connotation of comparison was agreed upon by Repatriation official, W. Keays, who, in August 1935, wrote: 'As regards complaints from British ex-servicemen, it is the opinion the majority received-whether oral or written-can be attributed to a comparison of the two policies, vis, British and Australian for the payment of war pensions and the provision of medical treatment'. 152 Repatriation Officials in Melbourne went onto explain: It seems only natural that more complaints proportionally will be received from British pensioners residing in Australia, than those resident in the UK, as the British pensioner will come in contact nearly everywhere with the Australian war pensioner, who receives a more liberal deal so far as pension matters are concerned. 153 Smith further advanced that the relative liberalism of the Repatriation Commission would inevitably give rise to discontent amongst British settlers: It is not easy in such an atmosphere to discuss freely the hard facts which must on occasion override sentiment. All these factors, and others of similar nature in the Australian scheme, inevitably tend to create dissatisfaction with the administration of a system which, by the test of time, has proved adequately to meet conditions in the UK. 154 Australia's distinct socio-political circumstances continued to influence the increasing divergence in national welfare policy. As Smith attested: Ex-service questions [were] always a live issue in Australia . . . political considerations provide an active part in pensions policy, and in Parliament by constant representation in the press and on wireless programmes, the public is continuously reminded of the demands or aspirations of the 'diggers'. 155 Claims for welfare or medical treatment were hampered by Ministry regulations, which stressed continuity of medical evidence directly related to war service in association with its 7-year time limit. 156 As Repatriation officials noted, due to this time limit on British claims, it was a standard procedure for the Ministry to reject claims if the claimant was not already officially classified on their pension roll. 157 The Medical Superintendent at a Repatriation Hospital in Brisbane told Smith that Repatriation medico-pensions officials 151 dealing with British claims believed Ministry time limits and 'Final Awards' to be 'rigidly harsh' and 'dishonest'. Repatriation officials in Perth headquarters similarly held that Ministry regulations were 'underhand'. 158 Another senior Medical Officer of the Commission felt the Ministry were unfair in placing a time limit on claims. He believed the majority of claimants were hard-working and honest men who had resolutely persevered with their medical conditions before eventually applying for help. 159 Smith was told of seven recently rejected British claims in Melbourne of which at least five would have been accepted under Australian legislation. 160 This instance highlights both the comparative liberality of the Australian system, as well as the previously cited financial incentive to not pass on the jurisdiction of the Imperial Pensioner to the Commission.
In Brisbane, RSSILA officials held the lesser pensions provided to tubercular Imperial Pensioners were unjust and miserly. 161 On visiting a Repatriation sanatorium in Victoria, which was shared by both AIF and British veterans, one Imperial patient asked Smith if his pension could be increased to the maximum 100 per cent allowance in line with the recent recompense provided to his fellow Australian patients. On receiving a negative reply, and in full-view of other patients, the patient coldly dismissed Smith and returned to his game of cribbage. 162 The plight of the British ex-service migrant in Australia was also reflected in their social standing. Not only was the King's National Roll not extended to Australia, but also British ex-service migrants suffered as a result of a lack of inclusion and protection within Australian Federal law, which decreed that government positions must be filled by certain quotas of Australian ex-servicemen. 163 British veterans were even discharged from their positions to accommodate the Australian veteran. 164 Writing to the Premier of the Tasmanian Federal Government, one British migrant complained that the prioritisation of Australian ex-servicemen ensured that 'it is hopeless for an ex-imperial soldier' to attain employment. 165 On hearing complaints of the preference of Australian veterans to British ex-service migrants at the seventh biennial conference of the BESL, W. Kemp, an official for the Australia ex-service charity, the Old Contemptibles, told delegates that such measures were 'quite right' and 'common sense', attesting: If any promises were made, they had been made to men of the AIF who went away on service. This preference was now constituted as one of the methods of Repatriation. If anybody was responsible for the repatriation of British exservicemen that was the British government not Australia. If the government of Australia agreed to the extension of the principle of preference to Ex-Imperial Service Men, there would probably by an influx of them into Australia right away, and Australia's own men would be out of work. 166 Smith similarly noted a 'definite antipathy on the part of the Australian public to providing for Imperial ex-servicemen . . . the general attitude was that if the disability were connected with the war, the responsibility should be that of the Imperial Government'. 167 Like the wider British migrant population who settled in inter-war Australia, the story of the British First World War veteran who migrated to Australia often appears to have been an unhappy one. 168 Smith similarly concluded that Australia was 'a hard home for the distressed especially to those from other countries'. 169 The Ministry's policy and procedure were thus judged to be inadequate amongst exservice bodies in Australia. 170 A Repatriation official in Canberra assumed that there would be a continuation of the isolation of the British ex-service migrant who 'feels neglected by his own people, and not sympathetically treated by his adopted country'. 171 Psychologically, sharing a country with inadequate rehabilitation infrastructure with a more revered veteran community appears to have worsened the situation. The Secretary of the TB Sailors and Soldiers Association in Victoria held 'there was an attitude of futility on the part of the men concerned, and this was detrimental to their health'. 172 By the summer of 1939, just months before the outbreak of a second global conflict, the Commission was still describing the 'considerable numbers' of fresh claims from AIF veterans. 173 In 1933, eight years after visiting Australia, Gilbert wrote to the contrary that the Ministry was 'gradually dying and, unless we have another war, a few years should see 'RIP' written over its portals'. 174 The Second World War would indeed confirm the Ministry's survival. The mass migration of Britons, which included ex-servicemen, to Australia in the immediate years following the second global conflict would ensure the eventual establishment of an official Ministry departmental branch in Adelaide. Following Gilbert and Smith, the Ministry's next tour of Australia occurred in 1952 considering the treatment of ex-service migrants of both the World Wars. 175

Conclusion
The Ministry wrote in 1934 that no government department had been criticised more across British society. 176 Four years earlier, the Commission summarised the difficulty facing nation-states and their rehabilitation of disabled the First World War veterans: ageing 166 and associated impairments of health, and the difficulty in objectively assessing the attributability of war service. 177 The BESL recognised that government departments across the British Empire faced immense difficulty in their tasks and that it was not fair to criticise them too harshly. 178 It remains difficult to judge objectively which national route was superior. At their most basic levels, the Australian system appears to have benefited individual veteran claimants, whereas the British remit protected public expenditure. This article complicates previous assertions that Britain and Australia treated its returning veterans in generally similar ways. 179 An inter-war analysis of the Ministry of Pensions, the Repatriation Commission and the British ex-service migrant instead illustrate how modernity has failed to achieve uniformity and satisfaction amongst western nations and their distribution of welfare and rehabilitation. 180 Contemporary welfare states continue to establish categories of prioritisation for public finance administered by national government departments. This binational case study identifies reoccurring type one and type two error problems in the administration of disability-induced welfare: policy can deny legitimate claims for state assistance while also validating and financing potentially illegitimate claims. Previous historians of rehabilitative departments have cited that pensions and treatment became a battleground in which a 'protracted civil war was fought' between veterans, families and charities versus state apparatus. 181 In Britain, the state's increased austerity and integration of social responsibility amongst its citizens in their welfare and rehabilitation programmes were fundamental. In contrast, in Australia, 'the battle for the Anzac legend' was won by those who regularly foregrounded the sacrifices of Australian veterans who featured prominently in national and public commemorations throughout the inter-war period for having given rise to the birth of Australia. 182 This article reinforces the thesis of David Gerber, an authoritative voice in the history of disabled veterans. Gerber correctly cites the seemingly ahistorical centrality of 'biopolitics', the relationship between societal and political perceptions of a conflict on state policy, in the analysis of the reception of returning veteran communities. 183 Ultimately, the British ex-service migrant did not benefit from British societal assistance integral to the Ministry's rehabilitation of disabled veterans. To magnify their discontent, those residing in Australia shared a country offering more generous and liberal compensation packages to its disabled veterans, where AIF-veteran rights were ring-fenced by a sympathetic public who not only protected but also improved their legal and political rights. With regards to the British ex-service migrants who shared Australia with AIF veterans, and to borrow from the lexicon of the First World War, they were positioned in a 'no man's land'. 177