Abstract
The gender differences in labor force participation and take-up of parental leave are accentuated in immigrant populations. This study examines whether certain policy features of parental leave are effective in leveling out the gendered differences among immigrants. We compare two distinct policy contexts, Finland and Sweden, and analyze the impacts of three policy reforms. Our results imply that policy features such as the earmarking of days and flexibility are the reason why immigrant fathers’ take-up of leave is higher in Sweden. However, analysis of policy reforms suggests that other contextual factors also play a role.
Introduction
The notion of equality permeates many aspects of welfare states, especially in the Nordic regime. The Nordic immigration regime promotes social rights based on residence rather than citizenship or contribution history (Sainsbury 2006). Another aspect of equality in Nordic countries is between genders. Examples within the family sphere are support for female employment via universal daycare provision and encouragement of fathers’ parental leave use (Ellingsæter and Leira 2006). However, at the intersection of these two equality domains, immigrant populations generally demonstrate greater gender gaps in labor force participation and take-up of parental benefits in the Nordic countries and elsewhere in Europe (Duvander 2010; Eurostat 2016a; see also Tervola 2015). Consequently, policy makers and political parties increasingly refer to gender equality among immigrants in pushing for family policy reforms (Skevik Grødem 2017).
The ultimate reasons for wider gender gaps in immigrants’ labor market participation are complex. They date partly back to the circumstances of their origins (Antecol 2000) and are also shaped by national migration policy (e.g. Eggebø 2010). Regardless of the root cause, it seems that it is mostly participation in child care that substitutes immigrant women’s labor supply. In a survey, Nieminen (2015) found that caring for a child at home was a major reason why immigrant women in Finland were not actively looking for work. For native-born women, the most common reason lay in sickness and disability. Therefore, promoting more gender equal use of parental leave is also a potential tool to level out the gendered differences in immigrants’ labor supply.
The policy design of parental leave has been found to be crucial for take-up rates (Koslowski, Blum, and Moss 2016). Parental leave may be accessible to both parents to share as they see fit, or parts of the leave may be reserved for each parent, often known as the father’s and mother’s quota. A third design is the conditional quota, incorporated in Finland from 2003 to 2012. Fathers received access to two bonus weeks if they used part of the shared leave. Such policy differences have different impacts on different strata of the population (Duvander and Johansson 2015). Different policy settings create different incentives and negotiation positions between parents, which may have different implications in immigrant families. It seems that a reserved father’s quota is making a major difference in the take-up at least among the native fathers (Koslowski, Blum, and Moss 2016).
This study contributes to the research area of policy impact with a focus on the important and growing group of immigrant parents. The overarching research question is whether various dimensions of a parental leave policy will make it more accessible to immigrant fathers. We examine this by comparing benefit take-up in two relatively similar—but at the same time crucially distinct—policy contexts, Finland and Sweden. In addition, we look at the impact of three specific policy reforms: the introduction of the second quota month (Sweden in 2002), the introduction of the conditional quota (Finland in 2003), and adding flexibility in how leave can be used (Finland in 2007). We aim to separate the impact of policies from other factors, such as the differences in the composition of immigrant populations or households’ economic situations. We also consider the duration of residence in the host country to indicate exposure to policy.
The study builds on the research tradition examining the role of policy by comparing two similar countries with in-depth microdata, allowing the differentiating factors to more easily be isolated and discussed (e.g. Neyer and Andersson 2008). For both countries, we use detailed longitudinal register data for first births between 1999 and 2009. We use linear probability models to estimate the propensity to use parental leave among immigrant fathers in comparison to native-born fathers.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present detailed descriptions of the national contexts: their policy systems and immigration histories. This is followed by a theoretical consideration of the appeal of different policy features to immigrants. Next, we move on to present the data at hand as well as the empirical specifications. Finally, we present our results and conclusions.
The Country Contexts
The Policy Systems
The Finnish and Swedish family benefit systems can both be portrayed as belonging to the Nordic family benefit models (e.g. Haataja and Nyberg 2006). They feature relatively long periods of leave and quotas reserved for each parent. However, there are also a number of nuances and differences that may be of importance when it comes to their usage by various groups of parents. In both countries, the current parental leave system originates from the 1970s, when it replaced earlier systems of maternal leave (Lammi-Taskula 2008; Lundqvist 2012). Both systems have developed since then. As depicted in Figure 1, the lengths of spells in legislation differ greatly both between the countries and over the past twenty-five years.
Development of parental leave legislation in Finland and Sweden 1991–2017.
Two main policy segments of fathers’ leave can be distinguished. In temporal order, the first is “daddy days”, the leave taken simultaneously with the mother. In Finland, since 1993, daddy days have lasted three weeks and, until 2013, were to be used during the first eight months of the child’s life. In Sweden, two weeks of daddy days were introduced in 1980 so that employed fathers could be off work during the child’s first weeks. The days are to be used during the child’s first two months.
The second part we call individual leave because of the fact that it cannot be taken simultaneously with the mother.1 Individual leave can be available for either of the parents to use (shared part), or it can be reserved for one parent (quota). Concerning the shared part, it is noteworthy that a conceptual difference exists between the two countries. In Finland, it is not reserved for either parent specifically. When it is applied, the other parent’s consent is not formally verified; in practice, the one who applies for the leave gets it first. In Sweden, the shared part is split between the parents, and the other parent’s consent is required for using more than half of the benefit days. The shared part has been used mostly by the mother in both countries but more so in Finland (Haataja 2009).
In Finland, a period of four months is reserved for the mother. The leave reserved for fathers was introduced in 2003, giving them access to two bonus weeks only if they used the last two weeks of the shared parental leave. The condition regulating the access to the quota was abolished in 2013, which can be interpreted as the introduction of a father’s quota in its true meaning in Finland. However, our analysis concentrates on the period when the conditional quota was in force and a few years prior (births in 1999–2009).
In Sweden, the mother and the father have quotas of the same length. Since their introduction in 1995, the Swedish quotas have been part of what can be considered a gender-neutral parental leave whereby the two parents have the same rights. The first quota month was extended by a second month in 2002, at the same time as the entire leave was extended by one month. A third month was added in 2016. In addition, since 2008 fathers have been encouraged to use parental leave through an extra tax credit, called the equality bonus. However, this bonus has not visibly affected the take-up (Duvander and Johansson 2012).
In Finland, nine out of ten families prolong the care period using the cash-for-care subsidy, a monthly flat rate benefit paid after parental leave to families who do not use the public daycare services (see Duvander and Ellingsæter 2016). The subsidy can be paid until the youngest child turns three. Salmi and Lammi-Taskula (2015) maintain that the popularity of cash-for-care is a major hindrance to fathers’ use of parental leave, as the father is not allowed to use the leave while the mother is receiving the cash-for-care subsidy. Moreover, if the mother intends to use the subsidy, the father is likely to be discouraged from using his short leave between the mother’s periods of parental leave and cash-for-care, especially as she then has to stop being the caretaker for a short period. In nineteen cases out of twenty, the mother is the one who uses the cash-for-care subsidy (Social Insurance Institution of Finland 2017). Immigrant families use the subsidy more often and for longer periods than do native-borns, reflecting partly their weaker labor market attachment (Tervola 2015). Sweden had its own cash-for-care scheme from 2008 to 2015. However, it was introduced only in the municipalities that chose to do this, and the benefit take-up rates remained a fraction of those in Finland (2 percent in 2013, see Duvander and Ellingsæter 2016).
When it comes to the father’s quota, it can be noted that Finland is following the Swedish system in small steps and with a lag of many years. As in previous respects, Sweden has tended to lead the way in family policy (Hiilamo 2002). However, large differences remain. For instance, the total parental leave is approximately five months longer in Sweden. Additionally, what is not visible in Figure 1 is the flexibility of the Swedish parental leave system. Parents in Sweden can use the benefit part-time, or they can postpone using it until the child turns eight years old (twelve years old since 2012). However, the possibility of taking advantage of the system’s flexibility depends greatly on the labor market status and the economic restrictions of the parent (Duvander and Viklund 2014). In Finland, the system’s flexibility is much more limited. The benefit has to be used in one spell starting approximately five weeks before delivery. However, the flexibility to use the conditional quota was increased in 2007 so that the benefit can be postponed until the child turns eighteen months, allowing the mother to use a short spell of cash-for-care before the father takes leave. Currently, fathers can postpone their leaves until the child turns two.
Whereas all mothers with custody who reside in Finland or Sweden have a right to parental leave, fathers’ eligibility for benefits differs between the two countries. All resident fathers are eligible for daddy days in Finland, and in Sweden, these are targeted exclusively at fathers in the labor force. Moreover, the father’s entitlement to individual leave in Sweden is tied to the custody of the child, which in the case of separation typically remains with both parents. In Finland, the father’s entitlement was more restricted until 2017, being tied to marriage or cohabitation with the mother. These cross-country differences have direct implications for immigrant fathers, as the labor force participation is lower for immigrant males than for native-borns (Eurostat 2016a), and as single and separated parents are overrepresented among the immigrant populations in both countries (own calculations).
The compensation level of parental leave is somewhat lower in Finland than in Sweden. In Finland, the replacement rate is 60–70 percent of earlier income depending on year and income. However, employers often supplement the rate to full replacement. The parents who had no income before taking leave receive a flat rate of 20.9 euros per day (2016, converted to a scale of seven days a week). In Sweden, the earnings-related part was originally 90 percent of earlier income but was reduced in the 1990s to 80 percent and in the mid-2000s to 77.6 percent. Also, in Sweden, it is common for the employer to top up the benefit, often to 90 percent of the preceding income. Parents who had no previous income will receive a flat rate, which up until 2002 was 6 euros a day but has since been increased stepwise to today’s 25 euros a day.
It is thus clear that daddy days are slightly more flexible and more generous in length in Finland than in Sweden, whereas the opposite is true for individual leave. Moreover, during our study period, the Finnish system did not incorporate the father’s quota in its true meaning but rather two bonus weeks conditional on the father’s use of the shared part and, consequently, conditional on negotiation with the mother.
Immigrants in Finland and Sweden
Despite some common features, the immigrant populations in Finland and Sweden have a number of dissimilarities. Sweden has a more extensive immigration history, which has led to a more substantial immigrant population (4 percent of foreign-borns in Finland versus 14 percent in Sweden in 2009). In addition, although refugee migration is present in both countries, it has been more prominent in Sweden.
Finland was a country of emigration practically until the 1990s. Especially in the 1970s, its oversupply of workers led to high flows of labor migrants to Sweden in particular. However, at the start of the 1990s, changes to Finnish immigration policy and the disintegration of the Soviet Union turned the country’s net migration positive. Finland suddenly faced simultaneous immigration flows from neighboring Russia and Estonia, as well as refugee migrants from more distant countries, such as Yugoslavia and Somalia. Migrants from Russia were mostly Ingrian Finns with a centuries-old Finnish ancestry (Dhalmann and Yousfi 2010, 222–226). At the turn of the millennium, Finland was receiving refugees increasingly from Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan. In addition, a growing number of migrants were moving from other European Union (EU) countries (Statistics Finland 2016).
As long ago as the end of World War II, the arrival of refugees from Germany and from the neighboring Nordic and Baltic countries turned Sweden into an immigration country. At the end of the 1960s, immigration from Finland increased drastically, whereas labor migration from outside of the Nordic countries decreased under the effect of the new immigration policy. Refugees from Chile in particular continued to come intermittently (Allwood, Edebäck, and Myhre 2006).
In the mid-1980s, the decades of refugee flows to Sweden began: first from Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and Eritrea, and at the end of the decade, from Somalia, Kosovo, and the countries of the former Eastern Communist Bloc. During the 1990s, with the breakdown of Yugoslavia, 100,000 individuals from the Balkans—mainly Bosnians—found a new home in Sweden (Lundh 2005; Statistics Sweden 2016). After the turn of the millennium, immigration from within Europe started to rise again, mainly as a consequence of the Schengen Agreement promoting free mobility within the EU. At the same time, refugee migration from Iraq started to rise again (Statistics Sweden 2016).
At the end of our study period in 2009, the largest immigrant groups in Sweden originated from Finland, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia (Statistics Sweden 2016). In Finland, most immigrants had been born in neighboring Russia and Estonia, followed by immigrants from the former Yugoslavia and Somalia (Statistics Finland 2016).
Finland and especially Sweden are countries with high labor force participation rates, but the immigrant–native gaps are among the highest in Europe (Eurostat 2016a). Moreover, the employment rates of foreign-born females are especially low compared to those of native-born females or foreign-born males. Strong heterogeneity by nationality prevails, reflecting partly the circumstances in the countries of origin (Antecol 2000). Migrants from typical refugee origins, such as the Middle East, are the most disadvantaged groups in the labor markets of both countries (Busk et al. 2016; Statistics Sweden 2009). However, migrants from the former Yugoslavia seem to be an exception in this regard, faring relatively well in Swedish labor markets. Migrants from the nearby Nordic countries and Central Europe are the ones faring the best (ibid.). The employment rates of immigrants converge to those of native-borns with years in the country, however, with persisting gaps even after ten or even twenty years of residence (Sarvimäki 2011; Statistics Sweden 2009). In both countries, the labor market integration of unemployed immigrants is facilitated by the provision of language teaching and other integration measures.
Why and How Would the Policy Design Matter for Immigrants?
Different policy features of parental leave have been noted to appeal to different strata of families (Duvander and Johansson 2015). We will now scrutinize the implications of different policy features, such as the father’s quota and the system’s flexibility for immigrant families specifically. We base our deduction on two theory strands: the economic perspective, which emphasizes the maximization of utility within the family (Becker 1965), and the sociological views, which put more weight on gender perceptions (Coltrane 2000).
The father’s quota, i.e., the earmarking of parental leave, increases fathers’ incentives to take leave in situations where the mother would usually be prone to take leave. From the perspective of the household economy, these situations can arise when the mother has a lower wage potential or probability of finding employment than the father has. Some existing studies support this by showing that fathers use less leave when they earn a higher share of household income (e.g. Saarikallio-Torp and Haataja 2016). The existing statistics on immigrants’ education levels (Eurostat 2016b; Sutela and Larja 2015) and employment rates (Eurostat 2016c) imply that gendered wage potential and employment probabilities are generally more polarized among immigrants than among native-borns. This indicates that earmarking has a stronger economic significance for immigrant fathers.
The earmarking would also play a role if mothers’ absence from labor markets were a result of gendered discrimination towards immigrant women. However, the evidence on gendered discrimination is contradictory and seems to vary largely by occupation. In fact, recent evidence from Finland and Sweden implies that employers discriminate ethnic men more than women (Arai, Bursell, and Nekby 2016; Liebkind, Larja, and Brylka 2016).
The earmarking of parental leave can also help with overcoming barriers related to parents’ gender views, which may also be a major reason not to take leave. For instance, in their survey of Finnish fathers, Salmi and Lammi-Taskula (2015) found that the main reason for fathers’ non-take-up of benefits in general lay not in the family’s finances but in the prevailing gender norms.
Gender views play potentially a distinct role for some immigrant groups. Finland and Sweden receive immigrants from countries with different gender norms in the public and private spheres. Female employment and education may not be generally supported, and household specialization is a norm. The typical origins of refugees, Iran and Syria, for instance, rank at the bottom of 145 countries for females’ economic participation, whereas Finland and Sweden are both in the top five (World Economic Forum 2015).
However, immigrant fathers in Sweden interviewed by Johansson and Klinth (2007) offer an adapted view, maintaining that it is mostly economic restrictions that hinder fathers’ involvement in child care. Moreover, in their study, Roer-Strier et al. (2005) point out that interviewed immigrants (in Canada) are well aware of the different gender expectations in Western countries and, as a result, usually mix ingredients from both cultures into their fathering practices. On the other hand, the contextual norms of some immigrant groups can be affected by the expectations the host country has for them to be “traditional” (Boyd 1984; Mulinari 2008). In Sweden, for example, this relates to the roles they take on in the new country (Government Commission 2012).
Some recent studies using different methodologies have discussed the role of earmarking for immigrant fathers and come to similar conclusions (Kvande and Brandth 2016; Mussino, Duvander, and Ma 2016). A qualitative interview study by Kvande and Brandth (2016) highlights the importance of the design elements of earmarking in the parental leave system in Norway. A register study by Mussino, Duvander, and Ma (2016) found that immigrant fathers were more reluctant to use more than the quota, implying also the appeal of earmarking to immigrants.
Another policy feature, the flexibility of the parental leave policy, can be crucial if the father’s work situation is somehow rigid. Employers’ and co-workers’ attitudes play a significant part in encouraging fathers to take leave (Haas and Hwang 1995, 2007). Previous research shows that self-employed fathers and fathers working at small male-dominated workplaces in the private sector are prone to using less parental leave (Brandth and Kvande 2002; Bygren and Duvander 2006). Although the self-employment rates of immigrants do not differ much on an average from those of native-borns, a pattern of occupational segregation exists where immigrants are under-represented, for example, in public administration (Åslund and Skans 2010; Myrskylä and Pyykkönen 2014).
The possibility of part-time use and postponing leave may also be advantageous if the father has an insecure labor market attachment. Based on available statistics, immigrants are over-represented in having part-time jobs and temporary contracts (e.g. Eurostat 2016c, 2016d), indicating more insecure labor market attachment in relation to native-borns on average.
It is harder to argue that the generosity of parental benefit would play a specific role for immigrant families. The income loss due to low replacement rate may very well be more critical for the low-income families in which immigrants are over-represented. On the other hand, high-income families lose more of their income in absolute terms when the replacement rate is low.
Restrictions on benefit entitlement, e.g. by citizenship or labor force participation, can create a major barrier to the immigrant father’s benefit take-up. The latter barrier comes from the fact that foreign-born males have generally lower participation rates than do native-born males (Eurostat 2016a). This can be due to immigrants’ higher propensity to be in education (Larja and Sutela 2015) or to have disability pensions (Österberg and Gustafsson 2006).
All of these immigrant-specific policy issues are likely to diminish as the immigrants’ duration of stay in the host country increases in length and their labor market attachment becomes firmer. This is backed up by recent results from Sweden (Mussino, Duvander, and Ma 2016) indicating adaptation to the leave-use pattern of Swedish-born fathers. A similar adaptation pattern has also been found for immigrant mothers in Sweden (Mussino and Duvander 2016).
It is noteworthy that, in addition to the policy design and labor markets, cross-country differences in immigrants’ benefit take-up can emerge from other issues, such as the information deficit. Salmi and Lammi-Taskula (2015) show that about one-fifth of Finnish fathers did not even acknowledge the existence of the Finnish two-week period reserved only for fathers. In addition, in Sweden, it seems that some fathers lack knowledge of their leave rights (National Social Insurance Board 2003). Information on and the promotion of fathers’ leave rights may be even more important for groups of fathers who lack language skills or have fewer social networks and other less formal channels of information.
Based on the above and the earmarking and higher flexibility of the Swedish system, we expect to find narrower immigrant–native gaps in fathers’ benefit take-up for Sweden than for Finland. The gaps should in principle diminish significantly in both countries after controlling for labor market attachment. However, for daddy days, the take-up in Finland is expected to be slightly higher than in Sweden, as the Swedish daddy days are restricted only to fathers in the labor force. Furthermore, we anticipate that of all reforms, the increased earmarking (Sweden in 2002, Finland in 2003) and flexibility (Finland in 2007) would in particular have increased immigrant fathers’ benefit take-up. Again, including controls should dampen the immigrant-specific effect.
Data
For both countries, we use detailed longitudinal register microdata for first-born children between 1999 and 2009. The large time span of eleven years enables us to separate the integration effect from the cohort effect. For Finland, we use data consisting of a 60 percent random sample of all mothers giving birth in each year (see Juutilainen 2016 for details). For Sweden, we use the Sweden over Time: Activities and Relations (STAR) database, which contains information on the total population.
We restrict the analysis to couples cohabiting with each other during the two years after the child’s birth. In this way, families with separated, emigrated, or deceased parents are excluded from the analysis. Moreover, we concentrate on first births, or, more accurately, on parents with only one child in their household at the end of the birth year. Consequently, not all parents in the data are strictly speaking first-timers, as their previous children may not live in the same household. However, we argue that the possible mismatch is irrelevant to the study. Based on this definition, the parents of twins and adopted children are excluded.
Despite Swedish daddy days being targeted exclusively at fathers in the labor force, we concentrate on all fathers. We did this because the available data have no specific information on employment spells but only on the annual wage, and we thus have no satisfactory way of identifying eligible fathers. Secondly, including all fathers facilitates the comparison with Finland. We control for the labor market status and wage level the year before childbirth to increase the comparability (see Methods).
Swedish parents can extend or postpone the use of parental benefits for an eight-year time span (in the studied period). We follow fathers’ use of parental benefits in Sweden only during the birth year and two consecutive years. Because most of the leave is used during the first two years (see Swedish Social Insurance Agency 2016), the binary benefit take-up is not greatly affected by the truncation. For daddy days, we used information from the birth year and from one consecutive year.
In the Swedish data, we cannot separate the parental benefit per child, only per parent. Multi-child families may have had more days of parental leave available during the follow-up, which, in turn, increases the probability that fathers would take leave. Consequently, we ran a validation test by controlling for the additional births during the two follow-up years. The changes in the immigrant gaps were negligible. Because of this, and due to the fact that the decision to have consecutive children can be seen as endogenous to the father’s take-up of leave, we report only the results in which the additional children are not controlled for.
Methods
Our aim is to compare the take-up of immigrant fathers’ parental leave use across Finland and Sweden. We analyze the binary take-up of the two types of parental leave: daddy days and individual leave, with the latter including both the use of the father’s quota and the shared part. We acknowledge, however, that some fundamental differences exist between the two parts; the shared part requires more negotiation between parents, as it also affects the mother’s time with the child.
We use regression to control for underlying socioeconomic and demographic differences from native-borns. We run the regressions separately for both countries and for both policies. In addition, to separate the integration trends effectively, we run a regression from which native-borns are excluded.
Comparing regression coefficients from two different samples can be problematic when it comes to dichotomous dependent variables. Generally, the dichotomous variable is regarded as a truncation of a latent continuous variable whose variance affects the regression. Dependent variables from different samples are likely to have unequal variances. In addition, logistic regression is heavily exposed to the omitted variable bias (Mood 2010). One solution that Mood (2010) suggests is to use a linear probability model (LPM) instead of logit or probit models. LPM is not biased by omitted variables to the same extent. In addition, LPM may be easier to interpret as an approximation of the marginal effect on the probability (e.g. Hellevik 2009). However, LPM does not solve all integrity problems (Holm, Ejrnæs, and Karlson 2015). For instance, the differences in the variance of latent variables are likely to affect LPM coefficients as well.
Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) note that the division of using LPM and logit runs mainly between disciplines: Sociologists tend to use more logit, and LPM is more common among economists. To ensure the robustness of our analysis, we ran both logit and LPM models. We found that they incorporate only minor differences and, most importantly, end up with the same conclusions. Only 0.2 percent of LPM predictions fall below zero or above one. Consequently, we feel safe in reporting results from LPM.
Covariates
The predictor of central interest is the father’s immigrant status, which is reflected in this case by the country of birth. Moreover, we compare immigrant fathers from different origins. The origin is expected to reflect some unobserved heterogeneity in employment potential due to, for example, education or the transferability of skills to the host society and also the potential impact of cultural issues.
The grouping by origin was encumbered by the fact that the available grouping in the Swedish data has been previously defined by Statistics Sweden. We ended up distinguishing six groups: four prevalent and relatively comparable groups across the two countries, namely fathers from the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Turkey, and the Horn of Africa (which contains mostly immigrants from Somalia and Ethiopia). The rest of the immigrant fathers are divided into two vaguer groups: fathers from “Western” countries and those from “other” countries. The group “Western” includes the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Europe and the Anglosphere (except for Turkey and Estonia, which is aggregated together with other Baltic countries in the group of “Other”). The comparability of these groups may be somewhat weak in the Swedish and Finnish populations generally, but our analysis focuses on more specific groups, the fathers who had their first child during 1999–2009. This narrows down the examined immigrant cohort. To increase comparability, we exclude fathers who had migrated before 1990; these are mainly Turkish immigrants in Sweden.
We base the selection of control variables on the theoretical factors presented above, both economic and sociological. However, many variables reflect both economic and sociological issues. For instance, labor market attachment can tell, not only about fathers’ economic situations, but also their cultural integration into the host society.
The incentives for household specialization are controlled by including the father’s share of the household’s pre-birth income. The father’s labor market attachment is taken into account by a compound variable of the father’s wage level and labor market position. The discrete variable includes three levels for wages as well as indicators for self- and non-employment.2 The mother’s labor market attachment is controlled with a binary indicator, as the mother’s wage level seemed not to affect the results substantially (calculations not shown).
We acknowledge the limits of the variables to control some aspects of the labor market attachment. For instance, the precariousness of the attachment and temporary contracts remain uncontrolled. In addition, we do not have information about the characteristics of the workplace, which can affect the possibility of taking leave.
Furthermore, we add a control variable indicating a native-born spouse, which we assume to reflect improved access to policy-relevant information. We control for the age of the father, which is bound to reflect the labor market attachment but also gender perceptions to some extent (see e.g. ISSP 2016). We also consider the duration of residence in the host country to indicate exposure to policy. The distributions of covariates are presented in Table A1.
To test the effect of the three policy reforms, we introduce cut-points for the reform years: introduction of the second quota month (Sweden in 2002), introduction of the conditional quota (Finland in 2003), and adding flexibility (Finland in 2007). Otherwise, we include a trend variable for birth years. The discrepancies in the lengths of the follow-up (see Data) are taken into account by controlling for the month of birth.
Take-Up of Parental Leave in Finland and Sweden
Table 1 presents the basic data descriptions by immigrant group. Following the two large and vaguer groups, the largest specific group in both countries is the fathers from former Yugoslavia, the smallest being the fathers from the Horn of Africa. The number of observations used is much higher in the Swedish data: In the Swedish data, the immigrants constitute 12 percent of all fathers, whereas in Finland, this figure is 4.6 percent.
Basic data description and average benefit take-up rates. Parents with first child born between 1999 and 2009
| No. of couples1 | Distribution (%) | Use of daddy days (%) | Use of individual leave (%) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Swe | Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | Fin | |
| Native-borns | 336,563 | 124,274 | 88.0 | 95.7 | 74 | 76 | 87 | 12 |
| Yugoslavia | 9,224 | 384 | 2.4 | 0.3 | 50 | 44 | 69 | 2 |
| Horn of Africa | 1,432 | 179 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 35 | 30 | 54 | 1 |
| Iraq | 7,384 | 297 | 1.9 | 0.2 | 31 | 19 | 48 | 1 |
| Turkey | 2,497 | 329 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 29 | 34 | 48 | 3 |
| Western | 8,904 | 1,524 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 59 | 65 | 72 | 16 |
| Other | 16,546 | 2,916 | 4.3 | 2.2 | 43 | 46 | 59 | 4 |
| No. of couples1 | Distribution (%) | Use of daddy days (%) | Use of individual leave (%) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Swe | Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | Fin | |
| Native-borns | 336,563 | 124,274 | 88.0 | 95.7 | 74 | 76 | 87 | 12 |
| Yugoslavia | 9,224 | 384 | 2.4 | 0.3 | 50 | 44 | 69 | 2 |
| Horn of Africa | 1,432 | 179 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 35 | 30 | 54 | 1 |
| Iraq | 7,384 | 297 | 1.9 | 0.2 | 31 | 19 | 48 | 1 |
| Turkey | 2,497 | 329 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 29 | 34 | 48 | 3 |
| Western | 8,904 | 1,524 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 59 | 65 | 72 | 16 |
| Other | 16,546 | 2,916 | 4.3 | 2.2 | 43 | 46 | 59 | 4 |
1For Sweden, the number of observations is the total population, and for Finland, it is the 60 percent sample.
Basic data description and average benefit take-up rates. Parents with first child born between 1999 and 2009
| No. of couples1 | Distribution (%) | Use of daddy days (%) | Use of individual leave (%) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Swe | Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | Fin | |
| Native-borns | 336,563 | 124,274 | 88.0 | 95.7 | 74 | 76 | 87 | 12 |
| Yugoslavia | 9,224 | 384 | 2.4 | 0.3 | 50 | 44 | 69 | 2 |
| Horn of Africa | 1,432 | 179 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 35 | 30 | 54 | 1 |
| Iraq | 7,384 | 297 | 1.9 | 0.2 | 31 | 19 | 48 | 1 |
| Turkey | 2,497 | 329 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 29 | 34 | 48 | 3 |
| Western | 8,904 | 1,524 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 59 | 65 | 72 | 16 |
| Other | 16,546 | 2,916 | 4.3 | 2.2 | 43 | 46 | 59 | 4 |
| No. of couples1 | Distribution (%) | Use of daddy days (%) | Use of individual leave (%) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Swe | Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | Fin | |
| Native-borns | 336,563 | 124,274 | 88.0 | 95.7 | 74 | 76 | 87 | 12 |
| Yugoslavia | 9,224 | 384 | 2.4 | 0.3 | 50 | 44 | 69 | 2 |
| Horn of Africa | 1,432 | 179 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 35 | 30 | 54 | 1 |
| Iraq | 7,384 | 297 | 1.9 | 0.2 | 31 | 19 | 48 | 1 |
| Turkey | 2,497 | 329 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 29 | 34 | 48 | 3 |
| Western | 8,904 | 1,524 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 59 | 65 | 72 | 16 |
| Other | 16,546 | 2,916 | 4.3 | 2.2 | 43 | 46 | 59 | 4 |
1For Sweden, the number of observations is the total population, and for Finland, it is the 60 percent sample.
The average take-up of daddy days during the study period is similar between Finnish and Swedish native-borns, but among immigrant groups, differences exist. Much larger differences are observed when looking at fathers’ individual leave: The take-up in Finland is a fraction of that in Sweden for all groups.
Figure 2 shows how the different benefits have been used in Finland and Sweden over time. Immigrant fathers in Finland have clearly increased their use of daddy days in the past ten years, whereas the use of individual leave remains marginal. In Sweden, both types are widely used, with individual leave being slightly more common than daddy days are. Daddy days are used by similar proportions of fathers in Finland and Sweden, both among immigrants and native-borns. It should be noted, however, that although daddy days constitute a significant part of the father’s parental leave in Finland, they form a relatively minor part of the father’s total benefits in Sweden when measured in the number of days (e.g. Swedish Social Insurance Agency 2016).
Proportion of fathers using different parts of parental benefits by immigrant status and birth year in Finland and Sweden. Note: To highlight the immigrant effect, only couples where both are immigrants or native-borns are included in the figure.
The take-up rate of native-born fathers exceeds that of immigrants for both types of leave and for both countries. What is most striking in figure 2 is that immigrants’ take-up seems to follow that of native-borns rather than that of immigrants in the other country. This implies the strong role of policy. However, other factors such as socio-economic background can still affect the take-up in relation to native-borns.
Abstracting the Policy Effect
To examine the issue in more detail, we move on to analyze the relative immigrant–native gaps while controlling for other determinants of fathers’ leave use. Here, we regard the native-borns as a reference of standardized behavior in the respective country.
Figure 3 shows that the immigrant–native gaps for daddy days are on the same level in Finland and Sweden, and they narrow down after controlling for labor market attachment and demographic features. For the take-up of individual leave, where the policies differ substantially between the countries, Sweden has much narrower gaps. In both countries, the gaps diminish significantly when including the controls, suggesting that the immigrant effect is largely caused by the labor market attachment. The gaps remain nevertheless significant after the controls, which implies some remaining unobserved heterogeneity. The different sizes of the gaps for individual leave in the two countries support the hypothesis of the policy effect.
Relative risk of immigrant father using the leave (ref. native-borns). Notes: Based on the LPM model coefficients divided by the native-borns’ take-up rate presented in Table 1, includes 95 percent confidence intervals. The full model controls for father’s and mother’s employment, father’s wage level, father’s share of income, father’s age, and immigrant status of the spouse.
The control variables included are limited in their potential to measure employment potential due to, for example, education or the transferability of skills to the host society and also the potential impact of cultural issues. In an attempt to consider this unobserved heterogeneity we add origin groups of the immigrants into the analysis.
This does not change the situation for daddy days notably (see Figure 4). For individual leave, results by group become ambiguous and hard to interpret. The difference in relation to native-borns seems to be more positive in Finland when we look at fathers from Western countries, but more negative for other immigrant fathers. This, we argue, indicates the limits of common indicators used as control variables in register studies, and general methodological challenges when analyzing policy effects through cross-country comparison. Immigrant fathers from Western countries in Finland are typically high skilled and more advantaged than native-borns on average, which is not adequately caught by our control variables. Therefore, we now continue with an analysis of national policy reforms to find out how various groups react to changes in the policy.
Relative risk of immigrant father using the leave by group (ref. native-borns). Notes: Based on the LPM model coefficients divided by the native-borns’ take-up rate presented in Table 1, includes 95 percent confidence intervals. Detailed regression results are presented in the Appendix (Tables A2 and A3).
We analyze the impact of three reforms of individual leave: for Finland, the introduction of the conditional quota in 2003 and the flexibility reform in 2007; for Sweden, the introduction of the second quota month in 2002. Figure 5 shows the crude take-up rates of individual leave by group and birth year. The benefit take-up rates in some groups increase visibly in the reform years: In Finland, the benefit take-up of native-born and Western fathers seems to react to the reforms, but for the other groups, the benefit take-up remains intact. The Swedish reform of introducing the second quota month seems to add to the benefit take-up3 of almost all immigrant groups, though with a lot of year-to-year variation in some groups.
Take-up rate of individual leave by group and birth year. The policy reform years are shown as vertical lines.
To estimate the impact more closely, we implement regression models with cut-points at the reform years. In table 2, we show the cut-point coefficients which represent the within-group percentage point changes in benefit take-up between the reform year and before. The results in table 2 are mostly in line with the conclusions drawn from the take-up rates in Figure 5. Introducing a conditional quota in Finland increases the take-up for native-borns by three percentage points and five percentage points for immigrant fathers from Western countries. For the other immigrant groups, the impacts are non-positive and lacking statistical significance for the most part. In Sweden, the reform effect is quite strong for all groups. The take-up among native-born fathers increases by five percentage points and among some immigrant groups even more. Iraqi fathers seem to have reacted the most with a ten percentage point change. It is pertinent to note, however, that the initial level of native-borns’ take-up in Sweden is much higher than for immigrant groups.
The modeled policy effects (change in benefit take-up rate as percentage points) in Finland (2003, 2007) and Sweden (2002) by group
| Finland | Sweden | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base model | Full model | Base model | Full model | |
| Quota reform | ||||
| Native-borns | +3.3*** | +3.3*** | +4.6*** | +4.7*** |
| Yugoslavia | −6.5 | −5.5 | +6.0*** | +3.4*** |
| Horn of Africa | −4.2 | −2.7 | +1.7 | −1.1 |
| Iraq | −5.5 | −5.4 | +10.1*** | +5.2*** |
| Turkey | −5.2 | −5.4 | +8.9*** | +5.8*** |
| Western | +4.7* | +5.0* | +3.4*** | +3.9*** |
| Other | −5.4** | −5.0** | +9.3*** | +6.2*** |
| Flexibility reform | ||||
| Native-borns | +8.5*** | +8.5*** | ||
| Yugoslavia | −1.1 | −1.5 | ||
| Horn of Africa | −5.1 | −6.2 | ||
| Iraq | −1.4 | −0.9 | ||
| Turkey | +2.4 | +3.2 | ||
| Western | +9.9*** | +9.5*** | ||
| Other | −0.5 | −0.8 | ||
| Birth month dummy | X | X | X | X |
| Birth year trend | X | X | X | X |
| Labor market controls | X | X | ||
| Immigrant spouse | X | X | ||
| Finland | Sweden | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base model | Full model | Base model | Full model | |
| Quota reform | ||||
| Native-borns | +3.3*** | +3.3*** | +4.6*** | +4.7*** |
| Yugoslavia | −6.5 | −5.5 | +6.0*** | +3.4*** |
| Horn of Africa | −4.2 | −2.7 | +1.7 | −1.1 |
| Iraq | −5.5 | −5.4 | +10.1*** | +5.2*** |
| Turkey | −5.2 | −5.4 | +8.9*** | +5.8*** |
| Western | +4.7* | +5.0* | +3.4*** | +3.9*** |
| Other | −5.4** | −5.0** | +9.3*** | +6.2*** |
| Flexibility reform | ||||
| Native-borns | +8.5*** | +8.5*** | ||
| Yugoslavia | −1.1 | −1.5 | ||
| Horn of Africa | −5.1 | −6.2 | ||
| Iraq | −1.4 | −0.9 | ||
| Turkey | +2.4 | +3.2 | ||
| Western | +9.9*** | +9.5*** | ||
| Other | −0.5 | −0.8 | ||
| Birth month dummy | X | X | X | X |
| Birth year trend | X | X | X | X |
| Labor market controls | X | X | ||
| Immigrant spouse | X | X | ||
Note. Based on the LPM model coefficients presented in Table A3.
The modeled policy effects (change in benefit take-up rate as percentage points) in Finland (2003, 2007) and Sweden (2002) by group
| Finland | Sweden | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base model | Full model | Base model | Full model | |
| Quota reform | ||||
| Native-borns | +3.3*** | +3.3*** | +4.6*** | +4.7*** |
| Yugoslavia | −6.5 | −5.5 | +6.0*** | +3.4*** |
| Horn of Africa | −4.2 | −2.7 | +1.7 | −1.1 |
| Iraq | −5.5 | −5.4 | +10.1*** | +5.2*** |
| Turkey | −5.2 | −5.4 | +8.9*** | +5.8*** |
| Western | +4.7* | +5.0* | +3.4*** | +3.9*** |
| Other | −5.4** | −5.0** | +9.3*** | +6.2*** |
| Flexibility reform | ||||
| Native-borns | +8.5*** | +8.5*** | ||
| Yugoslavia | −1.1 | −1.5 | ||
| Horn of Africa | −5.1 | −6.2 | ||
| Iraq | −1.4 | −0.9 | ||
| Turkey | +2.4 | +3.2 | ||
| Western | +9.9*** | +9.5*** | ||
| Other | −0.5 | −0.8 | ||
| Birth month dummy | X | X | X | X |
| Birth year trend | X | X | X | X |
| Labor market controls | X | X | ||
| Immigrant spouse | X | X | ||
| Finland | Sweden | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base model | Full model | Base model | Full model | |
| Quota reform | ||||
| Native-borns | +3.3*** | +3.3*** | +4.6*** | +4.7*** |
| Yugoslavia | −6.5 | −5.5 | +6.0*** | +3.4*** |
| Horn of Africa | −4.2 | −2.7 | +1.7 | −1.1 |
| Iraq | −5.5 | −5.4 | +10.1*** | +5.2*** |
| Turkey | −5.2 | −5.4 | +8.9*** | +5.8*** |
| Western | +4.7* | +5.0* | +3.4*** | +3.9*** |
| Other | −5.4** | −5.0** | +9.3*** | +6.2*** |
| Flexibility reform | ||||
| Native-borns | +8.5*** | +8.5*** | ||
| Yugoslavia | −1.1 | −1.5 | ||
| Horn of Africa | −5.1 | −6.2 | ||
| Iraq | −1.4 | −0.9 | ||
| Turkey | +2.4 | +3.2 | ||
| Western | +9.9*** | +9.5*** | ||
| Other | −0.5 | −0.8 | ||
| Birth month dummy | X | X | X | X |
| Birth year trend | X | X | X | X |
| Labor market controls | X | X | ||
| Immigrant spouse | X | X | ||
Note. Based on the LPM model coefficients presented in Table A3.
Controlling for the labor market attachment in the full model diminishes the effect for many immigrant groups in Sweden, suggesting the strong mediating role. However in Finland, controlling for the labor market attachment does not alter the results notably, implying the impact of other unobserved issues, which we will discuss in our conclusions.
Finally, graph A1 shows the take-up of parental leave by years since migration. The take-up of both policy segments clearly increases with exposure in both countries. However, the adaptation is largely, if not completely, explained by labor market integration and other controlled factors. In Finland, there is an adaptation trend of using daddy days, but the trend for individual leave is not statistically significant. In Sweden, immigrant fathers who have resided in the country for some time have a higher propensity of using both types of leave. The result is in line with previous results from Mussino, Duvander, and Ma (2016).
Conclusions
Gender equality is a fundamental principle of the Nordic welfare regime. However, existing statistics and previous research suggest that gender gaps in labor force participation and division of child care are accentuated in immigrant populations in the Nordic countries and elsewhere in Europe. More gender-equal use of parental leave would level out the gendered differences in immigrants’ child care participation and labor supply. This study examined how much immigrant fathers’ use of parental leave can be related to the policy design. The issue was scrutinized by comparing immigrant fathers’ take-up of parental leave in two different policy contexts, Finland and Sweden, and by investigating the impact of three specific reforms in these countries. Although Nordic countries can be regarded as outliers with regard to gender-equal policies, our analysis of the policy features can provide useful information to all those countries that are planning to enhance the gender-equal aspects of their leave policies.
The two countries provide similar types of parental leave for the father: daddy days at the beginning of the child’s life while the mother is at home, and individual leave, which can mainly be used by one parent at a time. Despite the similarities, great policy differences prevail: In Finland, the system of individual leave is more rigid, having been conditional on the mother’s leave use, whereas the Swedish system is more flexible and offers more independence in the father’s choice of use. However, daddy days are available to all fathers in Finland but are restricted to fathers in the labor force in Sweden.
Our study hypothesis asserted that parental leave use is facilitated especially for immigrant parents by the policy features of earmarking and flexibility, as the wage and employment gaps between sexes are more polarized among immigrants, and the labor market attachment is more insecure. Consequently, immigrant fathers are expected to use individual leave more often in Sweden than in Finland. In addition, because daddy days are more available in Finland, we expect immigrant fathers in Finland to use them slightly more often than in Sweden.
The results are partly as expected: Immigrant fathers in Sweden take individual leave more often than in Finland, and also, the immigrant–native gap in take-up is narrower, even after controlling for the labor market attachment. The results from the Swedish reform of introducing the second quota month (2002), i.e. increased earmarking, support our hypothesis further. The reform increased take-up for some immigrant groups more than for native-born fathers. The impact on immigrants was strongly driven by their labor market attachment. This finding is also supported by Mussino, Duvander, and Ma (2016), who observe immigrant fathers in Sweden as being more reluctant than native-borns to use more than their quotas.
The analysis of Finnish policy reforms tells a different story. In Finland, introducing the conditional father’s quota (2003) and increasing the flexibility (2007) increased only the benefit take-up of native-born fathers and immigrant fathers from Western countries, whereas other immigrant fathers did not increase their use. One probable explanation is the information deficit: In Finland, the immigrant population is smaller, and consequently, their networks are smaller. This can be seen at the institutional level as well: The comparison of the Web pages and the service provision of social insurance institutions indicates that multi-lingual services have been more available in Sweden. An information deficit has been prevalent among Finnish native-born fathers as well (Salmi and Lammi-Taskula 2015). The information deficit may also be the reason why the take-up of daddy days in Finland is on par with that in Sweden, despite their being more widely available in Finland. Alternatively, the discrepancies can be explained by the fact that, during the studied period, Finland did not incorporate a father’s quota in its true meaning, which perhaps restricted the effect of the reforms on immigrant fathers.
Methodologically, this paper pinpoints the challenges of the quantitative policy effect analysis performed through cross-country comparisons. The policy effect is difficult to separate just by comparing the national outcomes even after controlling the confounding factors. More credible conclusions can be acquired through combining the analyses of national policy reforms. The results also highlight the importance of unobserved contextual factors, which may be challenging to account for in quantitative analysis. One example of this is national information provision and immigrants’ own information networks. Here, the synergy of both quantitative and qualitative research is crucial. Further qualitative research will also facilitate the understanding of the motives for taking (or not taking) parental leave, through in-depth interviews with fathers and mothers.
Nevertheless, even if further analyses are needed to fully understand the results, our study has shown the patterns of leave use among subgroups of fathers, indicating differences in access to leave. The results suggest that the earmarking and flexibility of fathers’ parental leave have a role to play in reducing the accentuated popularity of the male-breadwinner model among immigrant populations. The Swedish results imply that these policy features may even play a stronger role in immigrant populations due to their more disadvantaged labor market position.
Acknowledgments
We thank our colleagues in Stockholm University Demography Unit (SUDA) and in the consortium project Tackling Inequalities in Time of Austerity (TITA) for the useful comments.
The corresponding author Jussi Tervola is a researcher at the Social Insurance Institution of Finland (Kela) as well as a doctoral student in the field of Social and Public Policy from the University of Helsinki. In the spring of 2016 he visited the Stockholm University Demography Unit (SUDA) as a guest researcher for five months to accumulate international experience. The work at hand is the main outcome of the stay and collaboration with the two researchers from Stockholm University. It will be part of his doctoral thesis which discusses the child care choices among immigrants.
Ann-Zofie Duvander is a Professor at the Stockholm University Demography Unit, and a senior researcher at the Swedish Inspectorate of the Social Insurance. Her research interests include family policy as well as the family -work -connection. She is an expert on parental leave policies in Sweden, with a special focus on leave taken by fathers. In addition to studies of parental leave parental leave usage and its demographic and economic outcomes, she has been involved in comparative Nordic and international studies. Duvander is a member of the Social Policy and Family Dynamics in Europe, Stockholm University Linneaus Center, Swedish Initiative for Research on Microdata in the Social and Medical Science (SIMSAM), as well as the International Network of Leave Policies & Research.
Eleonora Mussino is an Associate Professor at the Stockholm University Demography Unit. Her research interests include several immigrant-related issues such as fertility, the use of parental leave, the health outcomes and the determinants of integration. In her previous research she has focused mainly on fertility patterns of foreign women for different migrant groups in Italy. Mussino has also studied related aspects, such as the differences in the provision of antenatal care between native and foreign women and the role of antenatal care and citizenship in perinatal outcomes. Her studies also questioned the effectiveness of some Italian and Swedish policies for foreign women.
Footnotes
This research was supported by the Strategic Research Council of the Academy of Finland (nr. 293103), Swedish-Finnish Cultural Foundation (nr. 15/0332), European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for the research project Families and Societies (nr. 320116), Swedish Research Council via the Linnaeus Center on Social Policy and Family Dynamics in Europe (nr. 349-2007-8701), and Swedish Research Council for Health, Working life and Welfare FORTE (nr. 2016-07105).
1. Since 2012, parents in Sweden have been allowed to use one month of individual leave simultaneously.
2. The father is regarded as employed when his annual wage exceeds the threshold of twice the first decile of monthly wage in the annual wage distribution.
3. Examining only the take-up rate provides a limited picture of the policy impact of the Swedish reform. Duvander and Johansson (2012) observe a significant increase in the number of leave days used by fathers.
References
Appendix
The data distributions
| All | Immigrants | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | |
| N | 129,903 | 382,550 | 5,629 | 45,987 |
| Birth year (%) | ||||
| 1999 | 8.8 | 7.4 | 6.1 | 5.6 |
| 2000 | 8.6 | 7.9 | 5.5 | 6.3 |
| 2001 | 8.7 | 8.2 | 6.1 | 6.5 |
| 2002 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 6.8 | 7.3 |
| 2003 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 7.9 | 8.0 |
| 2004 | 9.1 | 9.3 | 8.2 | 8.9 |
| 2005 | 9.2 | 9.3 | 9.5 | 9.3 |
| 2006 | 9.4 | 9.8 | 10.5 | 10.5 |
| 2007 | 9.4 | 9.9 | 12.3 | 11.6 |
| 2008 | 9.4 | 10.0 | 12.6 | 12.4 |
| 2009 | 9.7 | 10.3 | 14.3 | 13.6 |
| Birth month (%) | ||||
| 1 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 7.6 | 8.0 |
| 2 | 7.7 | 7.4 | 8.1 | 7.4 |
| 3 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 8.3 |
| 4 | 8.2 | 8.6 | 8.3 | 8.6 |
| 5 | 8.5 | 8.9 | 8.4 | 8.9 |
| 6 | 8.5 | 8.6 | 7.7 | 8.6 |
| 7 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 8.3 | 8.9 |
| 8 | 8.9 | 8.8 | 9.1 | 8.8 |
| 9 | 8.7 | 8.6 | 9.0 | 8.6 |
| 10 | 8.5 | 8.7 | 8.8 | 8.7 |
| 11 | 7.8 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 7.9 |
| 12 | 7.9 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 7.5 |
| Father’s wage level (%) | ||||
| Low | 25.9 | 23.9 | 30.8 | 31.1 |
| Middle | 29.3 | 29.7 | 14.1 | 14.0 |
| High | 29.4 | 30.6 | 14.4 | 10.0 |
| Self-employed | 6.2 | 5.8 | 5.1 | 4.8 |
| Non-employed | 9.3 | 10.0 | 35.6 | 40.2 |
| Employed mother (%) | 84.6 | 84.8 | 59.0 | 48.4 |
| Immigrant mother (%) | 6.0 | 15.5 | 49.9 | 70.4 |
| Father’s age (%) | ||||
| <25 | 19.3 | 10.9 | 18.7 | 16.3 |
| 25–29 | 33.8 | 33.3 | 30.7 | 31.0 |
| 30–34 | 27.0 | 34.6 | 27.8 | 29.0 |
| 35–39 | 11.6 | 14.5 | 12.7 | 15.6 |
| 40+ | 8.4 | 6.7 | 10.1 | 8.2 |
| Father’s share of income (%) | ||||
| 0 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 12.2 | 13.2 |
| 25 | 9.2 | 5.9 | 16.1 | 12.3 |
| 50 | 51.9 | 65.8 | 33.4 | 32.3 |
| 75 | 30.3 | 19.2 | 25.2 | 14.6 |
| 100 | 5.8 | 6.4 | 13.2 | 27.8 |
| Father’s years in country (%) | ||||
| 0–2 | 43.3 | 43.2 | ||
| 3–9 | 34.7 | 34.4 | ||
| 10+ | 22.0 | 22.4 | ||
| All | Immigrants | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | |
| N | 129,903 | 382,550 | 5,629 | 45,987 |
| Birth year (%) | ||||
| 1999 | 8.8 | 7.4 | 6.1 | 5.6 |
| 2000 | 8.6 | 7.9 | 5.5 | 6.3 |
| 2001 | 8.7 | 8.2 | 6.1 | 6.5 |
| 2002 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 6.8 | 7.3 |
| 2003 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 7.9 | 8.0 |
| 2004 | 9.1 | 9.3 | 8.2 | 8.9 |
| 2005 | 9.2 | 9.3 | 9.5 | 9.3 |
| 2006 | 9.4 | 9.8 | 10.5 | 10.5 |
| 2007 | 9.4 | 9.9 | 12.3 | 11.6 |
| 2008 | 9.4 | 10.0 | 12.6 | 12.4 |
| 2009 | 9.7 | 10.3 | 14.3 | 13.6 |
| Birth month (%) | ||||
| 1 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 7.6 | 8.0 |
| 2 | 7.7 | 7.4 | 8.1 | 7.4 |
| 3 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 8.3 |
| 4 | 8.2 | 8.6 | 8.3 | 8.6 |
| 5 | 8.5 | 8.9 | 8.4 | 8.9 |
| 6 | 8.5 | 8.6 | 7.7 | 8.6 |
| 7 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 8.3 | 8.9 |
| 8 | 8.9 | 8.8 | 9.1 | 8.8 |
| 9 | 8.7 | 8.6 | 9.0 | 8.6 |
| 10 | 8.5 | 8.7 | 8.8 | 8.7 |
| 11 | 7.8 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 7.9 |
| 12 | 7.9 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 7.5 |
| Father’s wage level (%) | ||||
| Low | 25.9 | 23.9 | 30.8 | 31.1 |
| Middle | 29.3 | 29.7 | 14.1 | 14.0 |
| High | 29.4 | 30.6 | 14.4 | 10.0 |
| Self-employed | 6.2 | 5.8 | 5.1 | 4.8 |
| Non-employed | 9.3 | 10.0 | 35.6 | 40.2 |
| Employed mother (%) | 84.6 | 84.8 | 59.0 | 48.4 |
| Immigrant mother (%) | 6.0 | 15.5 | 49.9 | 70.4 |
| Father’s age (%) | ||||
| <25 | 19.3 | 10.9 | 18.7 | 16.3 |
| 25–29 | 33.8 | 33.3 | 30.7 | 31.0 |
| 30–34 | 27.0 | 34.6 | 27.8 | 29.0 |
| 35–39 | 11.6 | 14.5 | 12.7 | 15.6 |
| 40+ | 8.4 | 6.7 | 10.1 | 8.2 |
| Father’s share of income (%) | ||||
| 0 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 12.2 | 13.2 |
| 25 | 9.2 | 5.9 | 16.1 | 12.3 |
| 50 | 51.9 | 65.8 | 33.4 | 32.3 |
| 75 | 30.3 | 19.2 | 25.2 | 14.6 |
| 100 | 5.8 | 6.4 | 13.2 | 27.8 |
| Father’s years in country (%) | ||||
| 0–2 | 43.3 | 43.2 | ||
| 3–9 | 34.7 | 34.4 | ||
| 10+ | 22.0 | 22.4 | ||
The data distributions
| All | Immigrants | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | |
| N | 129,903 | 382,550 | 5,629 | 45,987 |
| Birth year (%) | ||||
| 1999 | 8.8 | 7.4 | 6.1 | 5.6 |
| 2000 | 8.6 | 7.9 | 5.5 | 6.3 |
| 2001 | 8.7 | 8.2 | 6.1 | 6.5 |
| 2002 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 6.8 | 7.3 |
| 2003 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 7.9 | 8.0 |
| 2004 | 9.1 | 9.3 | 8.2 | 8.9 |
| 2005 | 9.2 | 9.3 | 9.5 | 9.3 |
| 2006 | 9.4 | 9.8 | 10.5 | 10.5 |
| 2007 | 9.4 | 9.9 | 12.3 | 11.6 |
| 2008 | 9.4 | 10.0 | 12.6 | 12.4 |
| 2009 | 9.7 | 10.3 | 14.3 | 13.6 |
| Birth month (%) | ||||
| 1 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 7.6 | 8.0 |
| 2 | 7.7 | 7.4 | 8.1 | 7.4 |
| 3 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 8.3 |
| 4 | 8.2 | 8.6 | 8.3 | 8.6 |
| 5 | 8.5 | 8.9 | 8.4 | 8.9 |
| 6 | 8.5 | 8.6 | 7.7 | 8.6 |
| 7 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 8.3 | 8.9 |
| 8 | 8.9 | 8.8 | 9.1 | 8.8 |
| 9 | 8.7 | 8.6 | 9.0 | 8.6 |
| 10 | 8.5 | 8.7 | 8.8 | 8.7 |
| 11 | 7.8 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 7.9 |
| 12 | 7.9 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 7.5 |
| Father’s wage level (%) | ||||
| Low | 25.9 | 23.9 | 30.8 | 31.1 |
| Middle | 29.3 | 29.7 | 14.1 | 14.0 |
| High | 29.4 | 30.6 | 14.4 | 10.0 |
| Self-employed | 6.2 | 5.8 | 5.1 | 4.8 |
| Non-employed | 9.3 | 10.0 | 35.6 | 40.2 |
| Employed mother (%) | 84.6 | 84.8 | 59.0 | 48.4 |
| Immigrant mother (%) | 6.0 | 15.5 | 49.9 | 70.4 |
| Father’s age (%) | ||||
| <25 | 19.3 | 10.9 | 18.7 | 16.3 |
| 25–29 | 33.8 | 33.3 | 30.7 | 31.0 |
| 30–34 | 27.0 | 34.6 | 27.8 | 29.0 |
| 35–39 | 11.6 | 14.5 | 12.7 | 15.6 |
| 40+ | 8.4 | 6.7 | 10.1 | 8.2 |
| Father’s share of income (%) | ||||
| 0 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 12.2 | 13.2 |
| 25 | 9.2 | 5.9 | 16.1 | 12.3 |
| 50 | 51.9 | 65.8 | 33.4 | 32.3 |
| 75 | 30.3 | 19.2 | 25.2 | 14.6 |
| 100 | 5.8 | 6.4 | 13.2 | 27.8 |
| Father’s years in country (%) | ||||
| 0–2 | 43.3 | 43.2 | ||
| 3–9 | 34.7 | 34.4 | ||
| 10+ | 22.0 | 22.4 | ||
| All | Immigrants | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | |
| N | 129,903 | 382,550 | 5,629 | 45,987 |
| Birth year (%) | ||||
| 1999 | 8.8 | 7.4 | 6.1 | 5.6 |
| 2000 | 8.6 | 7.9 | 5.5 | 6.3 |
| 2001 | 8.7 | 8.2 | 6.1 | 6.5 |
| 2002 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 6.8 | 7.3 |
| 2003 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 7.9 | 8.0 |
| 2004 | 9.1 | 9.3 | 8.2 | 8.9 |
| 2005 | 9.2 | 9.3 | 9.5 | 9.3 |
| 2006 | 9.4 | 9.8 | 10.5 | 10.5 |
| 2007 | 9.4 | 9.9 | 12.3 | 11.6 |
| 2008 | 9.4 | 10.0 | 12.6 | 12.4 |
| 2009 | 9.7 | 10.3 | 14.3 | 13.6 |
| Birth month (%) | ||||
| 1 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 7.6 | 8.0 |
| 2 | 7.7 | 7.4 | 8.1 | 7.4 |
| 3 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 8.3 |
| 4 | 8.2 | 8.6 | 8.3 | 8.6 |
| 5 | 8.5 | 8.9 | 8.4 | 8.9 |
| 6 | 8.5 | 8.6 | 7.7 | 8.6 |
| 7 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 8.3 | 8.9 |
| 8 | 8.9 | 8.8 | 9.1 | 8.8 |
| 9 | 8.7 | 8.6 | 9.0 | 8.6 |
| 10 | 8.5 | 8.7 | 8.8 | 8.7 |
| 11 | 7.8 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 7.9 |
| 12 | 7.9 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 7.5 |
| Father’s wage level (%) | ||||
| Low | 25.9 | 23.9 | 30.8 | 31.1 |
| Middle | 29.3 | 29.7 | 14.1 | 14.0 |
| High | 29.4 | 30.6 | 14.4 | 10.0 |
| Self-employed | 6.2 | 5.8 | 5.1 | 4.8 |
| Non-employed | 9.3 | 10.0 | 35.6 | 40.2 |
| Employed mother (%) | 84.6 | 84.8 | 59.0 | 48.4 |
| Immigrant mother (%) | 6.0 | 15.5 | 49.9 | 70.4 |
| Father’s age (%) | ||||
| <25 | 19.3 | 10.9 | 18.7 | 16.3 |
| 25–29 | 33.8 | 33.3 | 30.7 | 31.0 |
| 30–34 | 27.0 | 34.6 | 27.8 | 29.0 |
| 35–39 | 11.6 | 14.5 | 12.7 | 15.6 |
| 40+ | 8.4 | 6.7 | 10.1 | 8.2 |
| Father’s share of income (%) | ||||
| 0 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 12.2 | 13.2 |
| 25 | 9.2 | 5.9 | 16.1 | 12.3 |
| 50 | 51.9 | 65.8 | 33.4 | 32.3 |
| 75 | 30.3 | 19.2 | 25.2 | 14.6 |
| 100 | 5.8 | 6.4 | 13.2 | 27.8 |
| Father’s years in country (%) | ||||
| 0–2 | 43.3 | 43.2 | ||
| 3–9 | 34.7 | 34.4 | ||
| 10+ | 22.0 | 22.4 | ||
Relative risk (ref. fathers who had been in the country 0–2 years) of father using the leave by time since migration. Note. Based on the LPM models including only immigrants. Detailed regression results for controlled models are presented in tables A2 and A3.
Regression results for daddy days. The percentage point change in the take-up
| All | Immigrants | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | |
| Birth year trend | 0.9*** | 1.0*** | 1.7*** | 0.4*** |
| Group (ref. native-born/Yugoslavia) | ||||
| Yugoslavia | −13.7*** | −11.3*** | (ref) | (ref) |
| Horn of Africa | −20.7*** | −22.9*** | −9.1* | −10.2*** |
| Iraq | −20.7*** | −21.8*** | −7.1 | −8.0*** |
| Turkey | −20.6*** | −25.4*** | −5.1 | −14.3*** |
| Western | −4.7*** | −5.7*** | 10.7*** | 3.8*** |
| Other | −14.8*** | −14.6*** | −0.8 | −2.5*** |
| Birth month (ref. January) | ||||
| 2 | −0.3 | −0.3 | 2.1 | 0.0 |
| 3 | −1.1* | −1.2*** | −4.7 | −1.6 |
| 4 | 0.5 | −2.6*** | −2.4 | −3.0** |
| 5 | 1.7** | −3.9*** | −1.4 | −2.6* |
| 6 | 1.7** | −6.4*** | −1.4 | −5.6*** |
| 7 | 2.2*** | −8.0*** | −1.5 | −7.8*** |
| 8 | 1.6** | −10.1*** | −3.3 | −9.7*** |
| 9 | 2.4*** | −12.9*** | −0.5 | −12.1*** |
| 10 | 2.9*** | −15.9*** | 2.9 | −12.5*** |
| 11 | 2.3*** | −21.0*** | 5.2* | −15.7*** |
| 12 | 1.0 | −26.6*** | 1.4 | −19.3*** |
| Father’s wage level (ref. medium wage) | ||||
| Employed/low wage | −17.0*** | −9.1*** | −16.1*** | −13.1*** |
| Employed/high wage | 0.0 | −3.4*** | −5.4** | −1.6 |
| Self-employed | −18.6*** | −24.0*** | −31.6*** | −28.9*** |
| Not employed | −45.6*** | −28.9*** | −43.1*** | −30.6*** |
| Employed mother | 8.1*** | −0.7* | −3.6*** | 2.5*** |
| Immigrant mother | −2.5*** | −4.0*** | 9.5* | −8.0*** |
| Father’s age group (ref. 30–34) | ||||
| <25 | 0.2 | −1.4*** | 1.0 | 0.8 |
| 25–29 | 1.9*** | −0.3 | 3.1* | 0.4 |
| 35–39 | −2.8*** | −1.7*** | −0.8 | −2.1** |
| 40+ | −28.0*** | −4.9*** | −15.6*** | −5.4*** |
| Father’s income share (ref. ∼50%) | ||||
| 0 (0–12%) | 0.0* | −13.1*** | 1.3* | −4.6*** |
| 25 (13–37%) | 1.3*** | −6.1*** | −3.3 | −3.0*** |
| 75 (63–87%) | −4.0*** | −5.1*** | −1.2 | −2.5*** |
| 100 (88–100%) | −2.5*** | −5.5*** | −1.7 | −0.8 |
| Father’s years in country (ref. 0–2 years) | ||||
| 3–9 | 2.5* | 4.1*** | ||
| 10+ | 8.4*** | 4.4*** | ||
| All | Immigrants | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | |
| Birth year trend | 0.9*** | 1.0*** | 1.7*** | 0.4*** |
| Group (ref. native-born/Yugoslavia) | ||||
| Yugoslavia | −13.7*** | −11.3*** | (ref) | (ref) |
| Horn of Africa | −20.7*** | −22.9*** | −9.1* | −10.2*** |
| Iraq | −20.7*** | −21.8*** | −7.1 | −8.0*** |
| Turkey | −20.6*** | −25.4*** | −5.1 | −14.3*** |
| Western | −4.7*** | −5.7*** | 10.7*** | 3.8*** |
| Other | −14.8*** | −14.6*** | −0.8 | −2.5*** |
| Birth month (ref. January) | ||||
| 2 | −0.3 | −0.3 | 2.1 | 0.0 |
| 3 | −1.1* | −1.2*** | −4.7 | −1.6 |
| 4 | 0.5 | −2.6*** | −2.4 | −3.0** |
| 5 | 1.7** | −3.9*** | −1.4 | −2.6* |
| 6 | 1.7** | −6.4*** | −1.4 | −5.6*** |
| 7 | 2.2*** | −8.0*** | −1.5 | −7.8*** |
| 8 | 1.6** | −10.1*** | −3.3 | −9.7*** |
| 9 | 2.4*** | −12.9*** | −0.5 | −12.1*** |
| 10 | 2.9*** | −15.9*** | 2.9 | −12.5*** |
| 11 | 2.3*** | −21.0*** | 5.2* | −15.7*** |
| 12 | 1.0 | −26.6*** | 1.4 | −19.3*** |
| Father’s wage level (ref. medium wage) | ||||
| Employed/low wage | −17.0*** | −9.1*** | −16.1*** | −13.1*** |
| Employed/high wage | 0.0 | −3.4*** | −5.4** | −1.6 |
| Self-employed | −18.6*** | −24.0*** | −31.6*** | −28.9*** |
| Not employed | −45.6*** | −28.9*** | −43.1*** | −30.6*** |
| Employed mother | 8.1*** | −0.7* | −3.6*** | 2.5*** |
| Immigrant mother | −2.5*** | −4.0*** | 9.5* | −8.0*** |
| Father’s age group (ref. 30–34) | ||||
| <25 | 0.2 | −1.4*** | 1.0 | 0.8 |
| 25–29 | 1.9*** | −0.3 | 3.1* | 0.4 |
| 35–39 | −2.8*** | −1.7*** | −0.8 | −2.1** |
| 40+ | −28.0*** | −4.9*** | −15.6*** | −5.4*** |
| Father’s income share (ref. ∼50%) | ||||
| 0 (0–12%) | 0.0* | −13.1*** | 1.3* | −4.6*** |
| 25 (13–37%) | 1.3*** | −6.1*** | −3.3 | −3.0*** |
| 75 (63–87%) | −4.0*** | −5.1*** | −1.2 | −2.5*** |
| 100 (88–100%) | −2.5*** | −5.5*** | −1.7 | −0.8 |
| Father’s years in country (ref. 0–2 years) | ||||
| 3–9 | 2.5* | 4.1*** | ||
| 10+ | 8.4*** | 4.4*** | ||
p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Regression results for daddy days. The percentage point change in the take-up
| All | Immigrants | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | |
| Birth year trend | 0.9*** | 1.0*** | 1.7*** | 0.4*** |
| Group (ref. native-born/Yugoslavia) | ||||
| Yugoslavia | −13.7*** | −11.3*** | (ref) | (ref) |
| Horn of Africa | −20.7*** | −22.9*** | −9.1* | −10.2*** |
| Iraq | −20.7*** | −21.8*** | −7.1 | −8.0*** |
| Turkey | −20.6*** | −25.4*** | −5.1 | −14.3*** |
| Western | −4.7*** | −5.7*** | 10.7*** | 3.8*** |
| Other | −14.8*** | −14.6*** | −0.8 | −2.5*** |
| Birth month (ref. January) | ||||
| 2 | −0.3 | −0.3 | 2.1 | 0.0 |
| 3 | −1.1* | −1.2*** | −4.7 | −1.6 |
| 4 | 0.5 | −2.6*** | −2.4 | −3.0** |
| 5 | 1.7** | −3.9*** | −1.4 | −2.6* |
| 6 | 1.7** | −6.4*** | −1.4 | −5.6*** |
| 7 | 2.2*** | −8.0*** | −1.5 | −7.8*** |
| 8 | 1.6** | −10.1*** | −3.3 | −9.7*** |
| 9 | 2.4*** | −12.9*** | −0.5 | −12.1*** |
| 10 | 2.9*** | −15.9*** | 2.9 | −12.5*** |
| 11 | 2.3*** | −21.0*** | 5.2* | −15.7*** |
| 12 | 1.0 | −26.6*** | 1.4 | −19.3*** |
| Father’s wage level (ref. medium wage) | ||||
| Employed/low wage | −17.0*** | −9.1*** | −16.1*** | −13.1*** |
| Employed/high wage | 0.0 | −3.4*** | −5.4** | −1.6 |
| Self-employed | −18.6*** | −24.0*** | −31.6*** | −28.9*** |
| Not employed | −45.6*** | −28.9*** | −43.1*** | −30.6*** |
| Employed mother | 8.1*** | −0.7* | −3.6*** | 2.5*** |
| Immigrant mother | −2.5*** | −4.0*** | 9.5* | −8.0*** |
| Father’s age group (ref. 30–34) | ||||
| <25 | 0.2 | −1.4*** | 1.0 | 0.8 |
| 25–29 | 1.9*** | −0.3 | 3.1* | 0.4 |
| 35–39 | −2.8*** | −1.7*** | −0.8 | −2.1** |
| 40+ | −28.0*** | −4.9*** | −15.6*** | −5.4*** |
| Father’s income share (ref. ∼50%) | ||||
| 0 (0–12%) | 0.0* | −13.1*** | 1.3* | −4.6*** |
| 25 (13–37%) | 1.3*** | −6.1*** | −3.3 | −3.0*** |
| 75 (63–87%) | −4.0*** | −5.1*** | −1.2 | −2.5*** |
| 100 (88–100%) | −2.5*** | −5.5*** | −1.7 | −0.8 |
| Father’s years in country (ref. 0–2 years) | ||||
| 3–9 | 2.5* | 4.1*** | ||
| 10+ | 8.4*** | 4.4*** | ||
| All | Immigrants | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | |
| Birth year trend | 0.9*** | 1.0*** | 1.7*** | 0.4*** |
| Group (ref. native-born/Yugoslavia) | ||||
| Yugoslavia | −13.7*** | −11.3*** | (ref) | (ref) |
| Horn of Africa | −20.7*** | −22.9*** | −9.1* | −10.2*** |
| Iraq | −20.7*** | −21.8*** | −7.1 | −8.0*** |
| Turkey | −20.6*** | −25.4*** | −5.1 | −14.3*** |
| Western | −4.7*** | −5.7*** | 10.7*** | 3.8*** |
| Other | −14.8*** | −14.6*** | −0.8 | −2.5*** |
| Birth month (ref. January) | ||||
| 2 | −0.3 | −0.3 | 2.1 | 0.0 |
| 3 | −1.1* | −1.2*** | −4.7 | −1.6 |
| 4 | 0.5 | −2.6*** | −2.4 | −3.0** |
| 5 | 1.7** | −3.9*** | −1.4 | −2.6* |
| 6 | 1.7** | −6.4*** | −1.4 | −5.6*** |
| 7 | 2.2*** | −8.0*** | −1.5 | −7.8*** |
| 8 | 1.6** | −10.1*** | −3.3 | −9.7*** |
| 9 | 2.4*** | −12.9*** | −0.5 | −12.1*** |
| 10 | 2.9*** | −15.9*** | 2.9 | −12.5*** |
| 11 | 2.3*** | −21.0*** | 5.2* | −15.7*** |
| 12 | 1.0 | −26.6*** | 1.4 | −19.3*** |
| Father’s wage level (ref. medium wage) | ||||
| Employed/low wage | −17.0*** | −9.1*** | −16.1*** | −13.1*** |
| Employed/high wage | 0.0 | −3.4*** | −5.4** | −1.6 |
| Self-employed | −18.6*** | −24.0*** | −31.6*** | −28.9*** |
| Not employed | −45.6*** | −28.9*** | −43.1*** | −30.6*** |
| Employed mother | 8.1*** | −0.7* | −3.6*** | 2.5*** |
| Immigrant mother | −2.5*** | −4.0*** | 9.5* | −8.0*** |
| Father’s age group (ref. 30–34) | ||||
| <25 | 0.2 | −1.4*** | 1.0 | 0.8 |
| 25–29 | 1.9*** | −0.3 | 3.1* | 0.4 |
| 35–39 | −2.8*** | −1.7*** | −0.8 | −2.1** |
| 40+ | −28.0*** | −4.9*** | −15.6*** | −5.4*** |
| Father’s income share (ref. ∼50%) | ||||
| 0 (0–12%) | 0.0* | −13.1*** | 1.3* | −4.6*** |
| 25 (13–37%) | 1.3*** | −6.1*** | −3.3 | −3.0*** |
| 75 (63–87%) | −4.0*** | −5.1*** | −1.2 | −2.5*** |
| 100 (88–100%) | −2.5*** | −5.5*** | −1.7 | −0.8 |
| Father’s years in country (ref. 0–2 years) | ||||
| 3–9 | 2.5* | 4.1*** | ||
| 10+ | 8.4*** | 4.4*** | ||
p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Regression results for the individual leave. The percentage point change in the take-up
| All | Immigrants | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | |||
| Birth year trend | 1.3*** | 0.2*** | 0.8** | −0.1 | ||
| Group baseline (ref. native-born/Yugoslavia) | ||||||
| Yugoslavia | 4.1 | −5.6*** | (ref) | (ref) | ||
| Horn of Africa | 4.0 | −17.9*** | −0.3 | −7.3** | ||
| Iraq | 5.8 | −18.1*** | 1.3 | −12.4*** | ||
| Turkey | 3.4 | −20.1*** | −1.4 | −17.9*** | ||
| Western | 1.2 | −6.2*** | −3.8 | −3.2* | ||
| Other | 3.9** | −11.6*** | −0.5 | −8.7*** | ||
| Quota reform (ref. before) | ||||||
| Native-born | 3.3*** | 4.7*** | (n/a) | (n/a) | ||
| Yugoslavia | −5.5 | 3.4*** | −4.0 | 4.1** | ||
| Horn of Africa | −2.7 | −1.1 | −2.0 | 0.7 | ||
| Iraq | −5.4 | 5.2*** | −3.5 | 7.2*** | ||
| Turkey | −5.4 | 5.8*** | −3.4 | 7.5** | ||
| Western | 5.0* | 3.9*** | 7.2*** | 5.2*** | ||
| Other | −5.0** | 6.2*** | −3.2 | 7.6*** | ||
| Flexibility reform (ref. before) | ||||||
| Native-born | 8.5*** | (n/a) | (n/a) | (n/a) | ||
| Yugoslavia | −1.5 | −0.1 | ||||
| Horn of Africa | −6.2 | −3.8 | ||||
| Iraq | −0.9 | 0.8 | ||||
| Turkey | 3.2 | 5.0 | ||||
| Western | 9.5*** | 11.2*** | ||||
| Other | −0.8 | 0.8 | ||||
| Birth month (ref. January) | ||||||
| 2 | 0.3 | −0.1 | 2.9 | −0.6 | ||
| 3 | 0.2 | −0.6* | −1.2 | −0.7 | ||
| 4 | 0.4 | −1.2*** | 0.4 | −1.9 | ||
| 5 | 1.1** | −1.3*** | −0.5 | −0.9 | ||
| 6 | 1.3** | −2.0*** | 1.0 | −2.5* | ||
| 7 | 1.4*** | −2.2*** | 1.9 | −4.0*** | ||
| 8 | 2.1*** | −2.4*** | 2.0 | −4.6*** | ||
| 9 | 3.2*** | −2.9*** | 1.3 | −4.9*** | ||
| 10 | 4.3*** | −2.8*** | 4.2** | −3.4** | ||
| 11 | 4.2*** | −3.0*** | 3.7* | −4.6*** | ||
| 12 | 3.2*** | −3.3*** | 1.9 | −5.8*** | ||
| Father’s wage level (ref. medium wage) | ||||||
| Employed/low wage | −4.7*** | −6.6*** | −2.7* | −10.8*** | ||
| Employed/high wage | 6.3*** | −2.3*** | 7.3*** | −2.4** | ||
| Self-employed | −7.0*** | −19.6*** | −6.1*** | −26.4*** | ||
| Not employed | −7.7*** | −24.6*** | −5.5*** | −29.6*** | ||
| Employed mother | −0.3 | 1.7*** | 1.8 | 4.4*** | ||
| Immigrant mother | −1.6*** | −4.3*** | −2.6** | −7.5*** | ||
| Father’s age group (ref. 30–34) | ||||||
| <25 | −6.3*** | 0.0 | −0.6 | 2.1** | ||
| 25–29 | −2.2*** | 0.6*** | 0.6 | 1.4* | ||
| 35–39 | −1.3*** | −1.8*** | 0.7 | −2.6*** | ||
| 40+ | −5.3*** | −5.0*** | −1.8 | −5.4*** | ||
| Father’s income share (ref. 50%) | ||||||
| 0 (0–12%) | −2.2** | −14.0*** | −2.9 | −4.5*** | ||
| 25 (13–37%) | −0.3 | −4.9*** | −0.9 | −1.5 | ||
| 75 (63–87%) | −3.8*** | −4.7*** | −0.9 | −3.4*** | ||
| 100 (88–100%) | −3.7*** | −6.0*** | −3.3** | −1.7* | ||
| Father’s years in country (ref. 0–2 years) | ||||||
| 3–9 | 0.1 | 2.6*** | ||||
| 10+ | 0.3 | 2.8*** | ||||
| All | Immigrants | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | |||
| Birth year trend | 1.3*** | 0.2*** | 0.8** | −0.1 | ||
| Group baseline (ref. native-born/Yugoslavia) | ||||||
| Yugoslavia | 4.1 | −5.6*** | (ref) | (ref) | ||
| Horn of Africa | 4.0 | −17.9*** | −0.3 | −7.3** | ||
| Iraq | 5.8 | −18.1*** | 1.3 | −12.4*** | ||
| Turkey | 3.4 | −20.1*** | −1.4 | −17.9*** | ||
| Western | 1.2 | −6.2*** | −3.8 | −3.2* | ||
| Other | 3.9** | −11.6*** | −0.5 | −8.7*** | ||
| Quota reform (ref. before) | ||||||
| Native-born | 3.3*** | 4.7*** | (n/a) | (n/a) | ||
| Yugoslavia | −5.5 | 3.4*** | −4.0 | 4.1** | ||
| Horn of Africa | −2.7 | −1.1 | −2.0 | 0.7 | ||
| Iraq | −5.4 | 5.2*** | −3.5 | 7.2*** | ||
| Turkey | −5.4 | 5.8*** | −3.4 | 7.5** | ||
| Western | 5.0* | 3.9*** | 7.2*** | 5.2*** | ||
| Other | −5.0** | 6.2*** | −3.2 | 7.6*** | ||
| Flexibility reform (ref. before) | ||||||
| Native-born | 8.5*** | (n/a) | (n/a) | (n/a) | ||
| Yugoslavia | −1.5 | −0.1 | ||||
| Horn of Africa | −6.2 | −3.8 | ||||
| Iraq | −0.9 | 0.8 | ||||
| Turkey | 3.2 | 5.0 | ||||
| Western | 9.5*** | 11.2*** | ||||
| Other | −0.8 | 0.8 | ||||
| Birth month (ref. January) | ||||||
| 2 | 0.3 | −0.1 | 2.9 | −0.6 | ||
| 3 | 0.2 | −0.6* | −1.2 | −0.7 | ||
| 4 | 0.4 | −1.2*** | 0.4 | −1.9 | ||
| 5 | 1.1** | −1.3*** | −0.5 | −0.9 | ||
| 6 | 1.3** | −2.0*** | 1.0 | −2.5* | ||
| 7 | 1.4*** | −2.2*** | 1.9 | −4.0*** | ||
| 8 | 2.1*** | −2.4*** | 2.0 | −4.6*** | ||
| 9 | 3.2*** | −2.9*** | 1.3 | −4.9*** | ||
| 10 | 4.3*** | −2.8*** | 4.2** | −3.4** | ||
| 11 | 4.2*** | −3.0*** | 3.7* | −4.6*** | ||
| 12 | 3.2*** | −3.3*** | 1.9 | −5.8*** | ||
| Father’s wage level (ref. medium wage) | ||||||
| Employed/low wage | −4.7*** | −6.6*** | −2.7* | −10.8*** | ||
| Employed/high wage | 6.3*** | −2.3*** | 7.3*** | −2.4** | ||
| Self-employed | −7.0*** | −19.6*** | −6.1*** | −26.4*** | ||
| Not employed | −7.7*** | −24.6*** | −5.5*** | −29.6*** | ||
| Employed mother | −0.3 | 1.7*** | 1.8 | 4.4*** | ||
| Immigrant mother | −1.6*** | −4.3*** | −2.6** | −7.5*** | ||
| Father’s age group (ref. 30–34) | ||||||
| <25 | −6.3*** | 0.0 | −0.6 | 2.1** | ||
| 25–29 | −2.2*** | 0.6*** | 0.6 | 1.4* | ||
| 35–39 | −1.3*** | −1.8*** | 0.7 | −2.6*** | ||
| 40+ | −5.3*** | −5.0*** | −1.8 | −5.4*** | ||
| Father’s income share (ref. 50%) | ||||||
| 0 (0–12%) | −2.2** | −14.0*** | −2.9 | −4.5*** | ||
| 25 (13–37%) | −0.3 | −4.9*** | −0.9 | −1.5 | ||
| 75 (63–87%) | −3.8*** | −4.7*** | −0.9 | −3.4*** | ||
| 100 (88–100%) | −3.7*** | −6.0*** | −3.3** | −1.7* | ||
| Father’s years in country (ref. 0–2 years) | ||||||
| 3–9 | 0.1 | 2.6*** | ||||
| 10+ | 0.3 | 2.8*** | ||||
p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Regression results for the individual leave. The percentage point change in the take-up
| All | Immigrants | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | |||
| Birth year trend | 1.3*** | 0.2*** | 0.8** | −0.1 | ||
| Group baseline (ref. native-born/Yugoslavia) | ||||||
| Yugoslavia | 4.1 | −5.6*** | (ref) | (ref) | ||
| Horn of Africa | 4.0 | −17.9*** | −0.3 | −7.3** | ||
| Iraq | 5.8 | −18.1*** | 1.3 | −12.4*** | ||
| Turkey | 3.4 | −20.1*** | −1.4 | −17.9*** | ||
| Western | 1.2 | −6.2*** | −3.8 | −3.2* | ||
| Other | 3.9** | −11.6*** | −0.5 | −8.7*** | ||
| Quota reform (ref. before) | ||||||
| Native-born | 3.3*** | 4.7*** | (n/a) | (n/a) | ||
| Yugoslavia | −5.5 | 3.4*** | −4.0 | 4.1** | ||
| Horn of Africa | −2.7 | −1.1 | −2.0 | 0.7 | ||
| Iraq | −5.4 | 5.2*** | −3.5 | 7.2*** | ||
| Turkey | −5.4 | 5.8*** | −3.4 | 7.5** | ||
| Western | 5.0* | 3.9*** | 7.2*** | 5.2*** | ||
| Other | −5.0** | 6.2*** | −3.2 | 7.6*** | ||
| Flexibility reform (ref. before) | ||||||
| Native-born | 8.5*** | (n/a) | (n/a) | (n/a) | ||
| Yugoslavia | −1.5 | −0.1 | ||||
| Horn of Africa | −6.2 | −3.8 | ||||
| Iraq | −0.9 | 0.8 | ||||
| Turkey | 3.2 | 5.0 | ||||
| Western | 9.5*** | 11.2*** | ||||
| Other | −0.8 | 0.8 | ||||
| Birth month (ref. January) | ||||||
| 2 | 0.3 | −0.1 | 2.9 | −0.6 | ||
| 3 | 0.2 | −0.6* | −1.2 | −0.7 | ||
| 4 | 0.4 | −1.2*** | 0.4 | −1.9 | ||
| 5 | 1.1** | −1.3*** | −0.5 | −0.9 | ||
| 6 | 1.3** | −2.0*** | 1.0 | −2.5* | ||
| 7 | 1.4*** | −2.2*** | 1.9 | −4.0*** | ||
| 8 | 2.1*** | −2.4*** | 2.0 | −4.6*** | ||
| 9 | 3.2*** | −2.9*** | 1.3 | −4.9*** | ||
| 10 | 4.3*** | −2.8*** | 4.2** | −3.4** | ||
| 11 | 4.2*** | −3.0*** | 3.7* | −4.6*** | ||
| 12 | 3.2*** | −3.3*** | 1.9 | −5.8*** | ||
| Father’s wage level (ref. medium wage) | ||||||
| Employed/low wage | −4.7*** | −6.6*** | −2.7* | −10.8*** | ||
| Employed/high wage | 6.3*** | −2.3*** | 7.3*** | −2.4** | ||
| Self-employed | −7.0*** | −19.6*** | −6.1*** | −26.4*** | ||
| Not employed | −7.7*** | −24.6*** | −5.5*** | −29.6*** | ||
| Employed mother | −0.3 | 1.7*** | 1.8 | 4.4*** | ||
| Immigrant mother | −1.6*** | −4.3*** | −2.6** | −7.5*** | ||
| Father’s age group (ref. 30–34) | ||||||
| <25 | −6.3*** | 0.0 | −0.6 | 2.1** | ||
| 25–29 | −2.2*** | 0.6*** | 0.6 | 1.4* | ||
| 35–39 | −1.3*** | −1.8*** | 0.7 | −2.6*** | ||
| 40+ | −5.3*** | −5.0*** | −1.8 | −5.4*** | ||
| Father’s income share (ref. 50%) | ||||||
| 0 (0–12%) | −2.2** | −14.0*** | −2.9 | −4.5*** | ||
| 25 (13–37%) | −0.3 | −4.9*** | −0.9 | −1.5 | ||
| 75 (63–87%) | −3.8*** | −4.7*** | −0.9 | −3.4*** | ||
| 100 (88–100%) | −3.7*** | −6.0*** | −3.3** | −1.7* | ||
| Father’s years in country (ref. 0–2 years) | ||||||
| 3–9 | 0.1 | 2.6*** | ||||
| 10+ | 0.3 | 2.8*** | ||||
| All | Immigrants | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fin | Swe | Fin | Swe | |||
| Birth year trend | 1.3*** | 0.2*** | 0.8** | −0.1 | ||
| Group baseline (ref. native-born/Yugoslavia) | ||||||
| Yugoslavia | 4.1 | −5.6*** | (ref) | (ref) | ||
| Horn of Africa | 4.0 | −17.9*** | −0.3 | −7.3** | ||
| Iraq | 5.8 | −18.1*** | 1.3 | −12.4*** | ||
| Turkey | 3.4 | −20.1*** | −1.4 | −17.9*** | ||
| Western | 1.2 | −6.2*** | −3.8 | −3.2* | ||
| Other | 3.9** | −11.6*** | −0.5 | −8.7*** | ||
| Quota reform (ref. before) | ||||||
| Native-born | 3.3*** | 4.7*** | (n/a) | (n/a) | ||
| Yugoslavia | −5.5 | 3.4*** | −4.0 | 4.1** | ||
| Horn of Africa | −2.7 | −1.1 | −2.0 | 0.7 | ||
| Iraq | −5.4 | 5.2*** | −3.5 | 7.2*** | ||
| Turkey | −5.4 | 5.8*** | −3.4 | 7.5** | ||
| Western | 5.0* | 3.9*** | 7.2*** | 5.2*** | ||
| Other | −5.0** | 6.2*** | −3.2 | 7.6*** | ||
| Flexibility reform (ref. before) | ||||||
| Native-born | 8.5*** | (n/a) | (n/a) | (n/a) | ||
| Yugoslavia | −1.5 | −0.1 | ||||
| Horn of Africa | −6.2 | −3.8 | ||||
| Iraq | −0.9 | 0.8 | ||||
| Turkey | 3.2 | 5.0 | ||||
| Western | 9.5*** | 11.2*** | ||||
| Other | −0.8 | 0.8 | ||||
| Birth month (ref. January) | ||||||
| 2 | 0.3 | −0.1 | 2.9 | −0.6 | ||
| 3 | 0.2 | −0.6* | −1.2 | −0.7 | ||
| 4 | 0.4 | −1.2*** | 0.4 | −1.9 | ||
| 5 | 1.1** | −1.3*** | −0.5 | −0.9 | ||
| 6 | 1.3** | −2.0*** | 1.0 | −2.5* | ||
| 7 | 1.4*** | −2.2*** | 1.9 | −4.0*** | ||
| 8 | 2.1*** | −2.4*** | 2.0 | −4.6*** | ||
| 9 | 3.2*** | −2.9*** | 1.3 | −4.9*** | ||
| 10 | 4.3*** | −2.8*** | 4.2** | −3.4** | ||
| 11 | 4.2*** | −3.0*** | 3.7* | −4.6*** | ||
| 12 | 3.2*** | −3.3*** | 1.9 | −5.8*** | ||
| Father’s wage level (ref. medium wage) | ||||||
| Employed/low wage | −4.7*** | −6.6*** | −2.7* | −10.8*** | ||
| Employed/high wage | 6.3*** | −2.3*** | 7.3*** | −2.4** | ||
| Self-employed | −7.0*** | −19.6*** | −6.1*** | −26.4*** | ||
| Not employed | −7.7*** | −24.6*** | −5.5*** | −29.6*** | ||
| Employed mother | −0.3 | 1.7*** | 1.8 | 4.4*** | ||
| Immigrant mother | −1.6*** | −4.3*** | −2.6** | −7.5*** | ||
| Father’s age group (ref. 30–34) | ||||||
| <25 | −6.3*** | 0.0 | −0.6 | 2.1** | ||
| 25–29 | −2.2*** | 0.6*** | 0.6 | 1.4* | ||
| 35–39 | −1.3*** | −1.8*** | 0.7 | −2.6*** | ||
| 40+ | −5.3*** | −5.0*** | −1.8 | −5.4*** | ||
| Father’s income share (ref. 50%) | ||||||
| 0 (0–12%) | −2.2** | −14.0*** | −2.9 | −4.5*** | ||
| 25 (13–37%) | −0.3 | −4.9*** | −0.9 | −1.5 | ||
| 75 (63–87%) | −3.8*** | −4.7*** | −0.9 | −3.4*** | ||
| 100 (88–100%) | −3.7*** | −6.0*** | −3.3** | −1.7* | ||
| Father’s years in country (ref. 0–2 years) | ||||||
| 3–9 | 0.1 | 2.6*** | ||||
| 10+ | 0.3 | 2.8*** | ||||
p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
