Mapping the International and European Governance of Renewable Energy

The aim of this article is to map out the governance of renewable energy and argues that effective renewable energy governance at the international and European level has become a major challenge of public international law and European Union (EU) law. The article first analyzes renewable energy governance in the context of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. It then examines the various international energy bodies that deal with the governance of renewables and deals with renewables in specific sectors of international/supranational law and policy, namely the sustainable development goals and multilateral development banks in the context of economic development, the G7 and the G20, international trade and, lastly, the European Union’s renewables legislation and policies, as examples of the most committed region in the world to renewable energy. This article concludes with a number of questions for further legal research resulting from the broad array of activity concerning renewables in EU law, international law, and international organizations.

forces that continuously replenish them. 3 They include solar, wind (onshore or offshore), 4 wave, hydro, tidal, geothermal, and biomass sources. By renewable energy governance, we understand the ensemble of the various institutions, legal instruments, and processes that deal with renewable energy towards the aim of mitigating climate change, which is a global public good. 5 Currently, governance of renewable energy is fragmented, with selective membership, and guided by state interests. This hinders transnational energy flows. Despite apparent overlaps between institutions and regimes involved in renewable energy governance, there are significant gaps in the system. The result is a mixed bag of incidental outcomes arising from an array of renewable energyrelated institutions and processes operating at various scales (bilateral, regional, etc), often with each having its own selective membership.
The article argues that effective renewable energy governance at the international and European level has become a major challenge of public international law and EU law due to the fragmentation of the system and the proliferation of institutions. As a result of the various institutions that govern renewables, interesting questions arise: Where are the governance overlaps between these institutions? What is the interaction between them as a result of this fragmented governance? For instance, is it hierarchical or is it polycentric?
Renewable energy has characteristics of a global public good and requires local and global action. Currently, there is no cohesive governance for global renewable energy. Governance of renewable energy arises by default, rather than design, through the ad hoc interplay of different aspects of the international economic system. 6 Several institutions involving different actors and 3 Volker Oschmann, 'Introduction to European Law on Renewable Energy Sources' in Leslie Parker, Jennifer Ronk, and Rachel Maxwell (eds), From Debate to Design: Issues in Clean Energy and Climate Change Law and Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 2008) 19. 4 Regarding the reliability of both wind and solar energy, there is the concern that the wind does not always blow and the sun does not always shine. This means that energy storage solutions are necessary. 5  geographical scope address renewable energy. As a result, we have a polycentric and very complex institutional structure. 7 Arguably, the complexity of the renewable energy system lends itself to polycentric governance. 8 The situation has resulted in a fragmentation of the global 9 and European energy regimes, a lack of cohesiveness of the global and European renewable energy systems, divergent national interests, and a diversity of energy sources. 10 For such a polycentric system to succeed, a high level of coordination and trust is necessary between the various actors involved. As it stands, the governance regime for renewable energy is not conducive to sustainable energy.
How can we explain the proliferation of renewable energy institutions? Some scholars focused on the international level suggest that the regulatory activity of various international institutions represents a 'regime complex '. 11 This concept is used to refer to 'partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area'. 12 Others propose understanding the governance activities by private and public actors in terms of a 'transnational regime complex', which is composed of civil society organizations, governments and business, which is coined as a 'governance triangle'. 13 In the same manner, how can we explain the fragmentation of renewable energy governance? And does it lead to forum-shopping? 14 It is vital that countries take the right steps and decisions to ensure renewable energy. A more cohesive governance system for renewable energy would facilitate its usage, avoid unnecessary legal disputes, and provide predictability. Achieving this will require a thorough understanding of the elements, workings, and evolution of the current renewable energy governance regime.
Renewable energy spans a number of policy areas, including trade, investment, economic development, and environmental protection. The World Trade Organization (WTO) provides governance over trade within its scope, including over renewable energy trade. Many other institutions exist that provide degrees of governance over aspects of renewable energy at the inter-state level. This patchwork of institutions and regimes amounts to a sort of 'accidental' renewable energy governance, and presents some areas of overlap. For instance, both the WTO 15 and the Energy Charter Treaty 16 have rules that apply to the trade, investment, and environmental protection aspects of energy.
Alongside the crisis of climate change, there remains significant unmet energy demand in the least developed and developing countries as well as significant barriers (including expense, technology, and grid capacity) to the growth of renewable energy in many such countries. 17 At the national level, renewable energy law and policy is often characterized by innovation and experimentation. A recent study conducted in fifty-five developing nations found at least 359 'clean energy-supportive policies'-almost half of which were introduced in 2012-13. 18 However, the challenge of effective steering from the international level remains.
Renewable energy governance is in many ways a subset of energy 19 and climate change governance, and has been described as 'seriously underdeveloped' at the global level. 20 Former International Atomic Energy Agency director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, has remarked that [w]e have a World Health Organization, two global food agencies, the Bretton Woods financial institutions and organizations to deal with everything from trade to civil aviation and maritime affairs. Energy, the motor of development and economic growth, is a glaring exception. Although it cries out for a holistic, global approach, it is actually dealt with in a fragmented, piecemeal way. 21 Part of the difficulty is that energy, as an issue area, straddles 'highly autonomous' systems of international economic and environmental law. 22 Particular 'institutional and structural diversity' has also been noted in the case of energy governance, as it relates to climate change. 23 A further dimension of complexity comes from the different properties of different sources of renewable energy. Indeed, there is also controversy as to what 'qualifies' for the label of renewable energy. As Bradbrook has observed, 'every energy resource involves a different interface with the law in terms of its exploitation'. 24 A glance at the multiplicity of processes through which governance of renewable energy is channelled at the international level may leave one with the impression that renewables are indeed a case study in the 'fragmentation' of international law. However, as will become apparent, a countervailing force to fragmentation has emerged in the networking and collaboration taking place across processes and between organizations. The international governance of renewables is increasingly the work of networks. As the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) has averred, 'partnerships remain embedded in every aspect of IRENA's programmatic activities'. 25 The sections below discuss how this constellation of actors and processes shape the development of public international law and governance relating to renewable energy. 26 There is evolving literature that tries to explain the complexity of governance in transnational networks and regimes. Although much has been written regarding regimes complexes and transnational networks, 27 and a smaller volume of literature exists regarding the role of private instruments in these transnational regulations 28 and regime complexes 29 and how they relate to social network analysis, 30 this article tries to add to the literature by filling an important gap in the current academic literature related to renewable energy governance at various levels (ie, international, supranational, and national). Scholars have explained climate change activities in terms of multilevel governance, 31 transnational governance, 32 polycentricity, 33 or fragmentation. 34 This article will go a step further and look at what may explain the governance of renewables. Is there a transnational legal order for renewables? If yes, what are its boundaries? If not, why did it fail to exist? The article will take the next step and examine the normative framework that relates to renewable energy governance at the inter-state level.
To understand the various and overlapping layers of renewable energy governance, this article benefits from global legal pluralism and regime theory. The latter argues that regimes or international institutions affect the conduct of States or other international actors in international cooperation. Regime theory is analysed in the context of idealism 35 and realism 36 to explain the knowledge gap in international renewable energy law and governance, given that it views regimes as intervening variables, such as power, interest, and values, on the one hand, and behaviour and outcome, on the other. 37 The article also benefits from the concepts of transnational legal order, 38 institutional theory, 39 regime complexes, 40 and systems theory. 41 Given the large choice of renewable energy institutions, legal instruments and processes, we have limited ourselves to some of the most emblematic and representative governance structures of renewable energy.
After this introduction, Section II analyses renewable energy governance in the context of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 42 while Section III looks at the various international energy bodies that deal with the governance of renewables. To help us understand the scope of renewables governance, Sections IV-VII deal with renewables in specific sectors of international/supranational law and policy, namely the sustainable development goals and multilateral development banks in the context of economic development, the G7 and the G20, international trade and, lastly, the EU's renewables legislation and policies, as examples of the most committed region in the world to renewable energy. Section VIII concludes with a number of questions for further legal research resulting from the broad array of activity concerning renewables in EU law, international law, and international organizations.
The governance of renewable energy is diffused. It is the product of a diverse constellation of international and supranational organizations, partnerships and bodies of public international law and EU law. Moreover, the evidence is that both EU institutions (such as the European Commission) and EU law (such as the Emissions Trading System) have played important roles in influencing the development of public international law regarding renewable energy. This is consistent with the requirement of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) that, in its international relations, the 'Union shall uphold and promote its values' and interests and 'contribute to . . . the sustainable development of the Earth' and 'the development of international law'. 43 37  With energy-sector GHG emissions accounting for around two-thirds of anthropogenic emissions, 47 the question of energy sources is inseparable from the problem of climate change. This is so because the economy relies on fossil fuels, which produce CO 2 , the major greenhouse gas. The international climate change regime, centred on the UNFCCC, has played an important role in spurring the development of renewable energy. For example, the UNFCCC regime has had the effect of promoting renewable energy as an important method for mitigating GHG emissions. In this way, the UNFCCC has both an indirect and a direct relationship with renewable energy: indirectly, emissions reduction objectives under the Convention have created incentives for the installation of renewable capacity; and directly, UNFCCC provisions and programmes have supported the development and proliferation of renewable energy, alongside other climate technologies. 48 44 50 Article 2 of the UNFCCC commits nations to 'stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system'. 51 The Convention enunciated a set of principles, including differentiated commitments for developed and developing countries and established an institutional architecture, with the Conference of Parties (COP) as the governing body. In the years since 1994, negotiations under the UNFCCC have grappled with the difficult task of bringing the Convention's ultimate objective stipulated in Article 2 within reach.
The Convention includes the principle that parties have 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' (CBDRRC). 52 In assigning obligations to parties, the Convention divides countries between developed countries and countries 'undergoing the process of transition to a market economy', listed in Annex I, and non-Annex I countries. Pursuant to the CBDRRC principle, all parties to the Convention must maintain GHG emission inventories, introduce mitigation and adaptation programmes and cooperate on mitigation and adaptation, among other obligations, 53 only Annex I countries must adopt national mitigation policies and must assist non-Annex I parties with finance and technology transfer, among other obligations. 54 In addition, developed countries must 'take the lead in combating climate change'. 55

B. The Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC introduced specific climate mitigation commitments for Annex I parties. Agreed in 1997 and coming into force in 2005, Kyoto charged Annex I parties with reducing their emissions by an average of 5 per cent below 1990 levels during the commitment period in 2008-12. 56 The EU was required to reduce its collective emissions by 8 per cent during the first commitment period. 57 The EU responded to this requirement by adopting regulations to reduce emissions by 20 per cent by 2020, significantly exceeding the Kyoto Protocol target, and increase the share of energy generated by renewables to 20 per cent by 2020. 58 As the first commitment period expired prior to the agreement of a comprehensive global climate deal, the Kyoto Protocol was extended with a second commitment period lasting from 2013 to 2020. 59 Notably, the United States never ratified the Kyoto Protocol and Canada withdrew from it. Three 'flexibility mechanisms' were created to assist parties with Kyoto obligations to meet their targets: emissions trading; 60 the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); 61 and Joint Implementation (JI). 62 The COP provided detailed guidance on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, including these three market-based mechanisms, in the 2001 Marrakesh Accords. 63 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) enables Annex I parties to count Certified Emission Reduction units (CERs) resulting from emissions-reducing activities in non-Annex I countries toward their own emission reduction obligations. 64 The CDM provides 'top-up, supplemental financing that makes low-emitting projects competitive against cheaper but higher-emitting alternatives'. 65 Following the agreement of the Marrakesh Accords at the 2001 UNFCCC COP, the EU introduced Directive 2003/87/EC, establishing the EU ETS 'to contribute to fulfilling the commitments of the European Community and its Member States more effectively, through an efficient European market in greenhouse gas emission allowances, with the least possible diminution of economic development and employment'. 66 The following year, the EU introduced Directive 2004/101/EC, allowing CDM and JI carbon credits to be used by EU ETS participants to fulfil a proportion of their obligations under the EU ETS. 67 By 2015, over 7,900 CDM projects and programmes had been registered in 107 countries, resulting in over 1.6 billion CERs. 68 Seventy-one per cent of CDM projects have been renewable projects, including wind (31 per cent), hydro (26 per cent), biomass (9 per cent) and solar (5 per cent). 69 In addition, Joint Implementation projects had resulted in the issuing of over 870,000 emission reductions units (ERUs). 70 The central significance of the EU to these international mechanisms is indicated by the fact that, by 30 April 2015, 1,445 million international credits had been used or exchanged within the EU ETS. 71 Under the EU ETS, market participants have been allowed to use CDM and JI credits to meet only a given percentage of their obligations under the system. For the third and current EU ETS trading period, which runs from 2013 to 2020, additional restrictions on the use of international credits were introduced, including the requirement that projects be hosted in least-developing countries. 72 The restrictions on use of CERs in the EU ETS has had a major impact on operations under the CDM. The 2015 CDM annual report 66  climate projects which are not focused on renewable energy. 81 However, as the GCF's Board's 'strategic vision' includes 'financing innovative projects and programmes, inter alia supporting the application and dissemination of cuttingedge climate technologies', 82 there is scope for the GCF to play a significant role in the governance of renewables.
D. Climate governance following the entry into force of the Paris Agreement In 2011, nations agreed to adopt by 2015, 'a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties', to come into effect from 2020. 83 The resulting Paris Agreement was adopted in December 2015 at COP 21. Significantly, the Paris Agreement departs from a differentiation of countries on the basis of the Convention's annexes in favour of a differentiation between 'developed' and 'developing' countries 'in the light of different national circumstances'. 84 The Agreement will enter into force following ratification by 'at least 55 Parties to the Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 percent of the total global greenhouse gas emissions'. 85 This happened in November 2016.
The adoption of the Paris Agreement is a major development in the global governance of renewable energy. Meeting the Agreement's long-term goal of restricting the global average temperature increase to 'well below 28C above preindustrial levels', while 'pursu[ing] efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.58C', 86 and 'achiev[ing] a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century', 87 will require significant increases in renewable energy generation.
Nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are central to the post-2020 climate change mitigation architecture. NDCs are targets and action plans for climate mitigation and adaptation defined by individual countries. 88 Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries should undertake 'economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets', while developing countries should 'continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances'. 89 The Paris Agreement requires each country to communicate an NDC every five years, 90 and should be more ambitious than the previous one. 91 Parties' obligations to communicate and account for their NDCs are set out in Article 4 of the Agreement. A 'global stocktake' held every five years, beginning in 2023, will assess progress in implementing the Agreement and 'shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing' their national actions and international cooperation. 92 Most countries submitted the first iteration of their climate plans to the UNFCCC Secretariat in the course of 2015, in the form of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). 93 These plans highlight the pledge-and-review model's 94 indirect but significant impact on the regulation of renewables at the national level. The UNFCCC Secretariat's report, analysing 119 INDCs, found that '[r]enewable energy was highlighted in many INDCs', which nominated actions including feed-in tariffs and investment in renewable generation and grid infrastructure. 95 For example, China has pledged to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy production to around 20 per cent. 96 India has set a target of about 40 per cent of accumulated electric power installed capacity to be drawn from non-fossil fuel based energy sources. 97 'A few' parties included 'quantified renewable energy targets' in their INDCs, the most ambitious of which aim for 100 per cent renewable electricity generation. 98 According to the report, the necessity to communicate INDCs changed national policy processes, or example, resulting in the 'establishment of new institutional arrangements and consultation processes'. 99 The report concludes: National political and institutional processes have been partly influenced by the invitation for Parties to communicate their INDCs. While INDCs may have served as a catalyst for the consolidation and enhancement of climate-related policies in a few 89  countries, in many it has represented an incentive to initiate them. In general, it can be argued that the realities of policy development and of social acceptance related to the preparation of the INDCs provide the grounds for increased action in the future. 100 The EU's INDC commits to a 'binding target of an at least 40 per cent domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990'. 101 The EU has announced that, in order to facilitate this outcome, 'the ETS is to be reformed and strengthened'. 102 In addition to the mitigation regime built around NDCs, the Paris Agreement provides for increased international cooperation relevant to renewable energy. The Agreement commits nations to 'strengthen cooperative action on technology development and transfer', including through the establishment of a 'technology framework' to guide the work of the Technology Mechanism. 103 The Agreement calls for both the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC to support '[a]ccelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation' of technology, 104 and the associated COP decision resolves to strengthen the Technology Mechanism and provides a mandate for a variety of related activities. 105 Article 6 of the Agreement provides for a market mechanism for countries to cooperate on emissions reductions, which may be expected to build on the experience of the Clean Development Mechanism. 106 By embedding national climate policies in five-yearly processes of international stocktakes and NDC submissions, the Paris Agreement sets up an iterative interaction between the public international law framework of the UNFCCC and national (and EU) policy making. This is likely to strengthen the influence of the UNFCCC on the development of EU regulation, while the peer-review process may encourage regulatory learnings between the EU and other parties to the UNFCCC.

III. International energy organizations and multi-stakeholder partnerships in the governance of renewables
As significant as the UNFCCC has proven to be in spurring the development of renewables in order to mitigate climate change, a broad array of other 100  international organizations and multi-stakeholder partnerships have also contributed to the governance of renewables. Many of these instruments take the form of 'soft law'. 107 Indeed, the prominence of non-binding transnational renewable energy initiatives recalls the major role played by 'soft law' in the elaboration of international environmental law. 108 The nature of the renewable initiatives of this institutional landscape prompts a number of questions for legal research discussed in greater detail at the end of this article, including investigations into the relationship between transnational (voluntary) initiatives and policy making and regulatory change in participating countries.

A. The International Energy Agency
The International Energy Agency (IEA) was formed in 1974 to coordinate the response of oil importers' to major disruptions in the supply of oil. With membership requirements including membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and a ninety-day reserve of crude oil or product equivalent, the twenty-nine-member organization has traditionally focused on fossil fuels. In recent years, the IEA has expanded its work on loweremission energy sources.

B. The International Renewable Energy Agency
IRENA was established in 2011, following agreement in 2009, to 'promote the widespread and increased adoption and the sustainable use of all forms of renewable energy'. 116 As of October 2016, and after five years of existence, IRENA had 149 members with an additional 27 states in the process of accession, 117 'with activities taking place in 90 countries around the world'. 118 IRENA supports member states in their adoption of renewables, including through the provision of data and publications, collaborations with member states and groups of countries on policy and market development and a concessional finance programme. 119 As a young institution, IRENA has increased its impact through collaboration with other intergovernmental processes. 120 IRENA is an intergovernmental organization which purports to support countries in their transition to a sustainable energy future. 121 The organization serves as the main platform for international cooperation as well as being a centre of policy, technology, resources, and financial knowledge on renewable energy. 122 IRENA's main goal is to foster the widespread adoption and sustainable use of renewable energy (such as bioenergy, geothermal, hydropower, ocean, solar, or wind energy) in the quest towards sustainable development, energy access, energy security, and low-carbon economic growth and prosperity. The main global energy challenge for IRENA is to promote the global use of renewable energy. According to the latest available data issued by the IEA, fossil fuels accounted for 81.7 per cent of the world's total energy mix, whilst renewable energy sources accounted for a meagre 13.5 per cent of the global energy mix in 2012. 124 Along with climate change mitigation, promoting sustainable development is a vital global energy challenge. In that sense, 'the only way forward is to increase access to energy for all-but energy that is clean, efficient, and renewable. Continuing in the current vein is not an option'. 125 The future of renewable energy will largely depend on a wide variety of factors, including elevated prices of fossil fuels, price reduction of many renewable technologies, and the enhancement of these technologies in order to make them more efficient. 126 IRENA is carving out a role for itself as the major advocate of this longed-for transition towards a cleaner energy mix. It is doing so, inter alia, by facilitating a wealth of information, which enables investors to determine where different types of renewable energy projects are most feasible, 127 as well as by drafting initiatives and contributing financially to these projects. 128 In spite of the large consensus on the need to urgently tackle climate change by shifting from highly polluting fossil fuels to renewable energy, the heavy economic strain of such a conversion prevents global leaders from taking decisive steps in that direction. The need to make renewable energy economically profitable has been recognized by IRENA Director-General, Adnan Amin, who observed that incentive on its own to spur renewable energy usage worldwide. Moving forward, the promotion of renewables will therefore have to be reconciled with economic objectives.
In June 2014, IRENA developed a global renewable energy roadmap, which pursues the ambitious objective of doubling the share of renewables in the global energy mix by 2030. 130 Even though the roadmap concedes that only a few countries have explicit policies to promote renewables in the manufacturing sector, the overall tone of the document remains optimistic as it suggests that existing and future renewable energy expansion projects will increase the share of renewables by 21 per cent by 2030. 131 Moreover, linking economic as well as social benefits with the promotion of renewables, IRENA estimated that, in 2013, up to 6.5 million jobs stemmed from the renewable energy sector with a promising trend expected for the following years and with solar and wind energy leading the way as the most dynamic renewable energy technologies. 132 The main employers were China, Brazil, the USA, India, Germany, Spain, and Bangladesh. 133 The focus of IRENA's current projects is mainly on developing countries, especially emerging markets in Asia and Africa, as these appear to be the most fertile environments to promote the use of renewables. 134 This is because these countries are at a relatively early stage in terms of infrastructure and, in some cases, have an urgent need to tackle pollution. 135 Thus, rapidly developing countries, such as Nigeria, are confronted with the dilemma of adopting a myopic mindset by further investing in fossil fuels, with the detrimental consequences this entails for the environment, versus taking effective steps towards the transition to a more sustainable energy mix.
In January 2015, IRENA and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development announced that they would provide USD57 million under the Project Facility to finance renewable energy projects scattered all over the world. 136 This is the second loan cycle of seven, which together will commit USD350 million over seven years to the deployment of renewable energy in developing countries. In particular, the loans of the second cycle will go to projects in a geographically diverse set of countries, including Argentina, Cuba, Iran, Mauritania, and St Vincent and the Grenadines. The projects to be financed in this cycle have a combined total capacity of 35 megawatts, bringing reliable and sustainable 130  power to more than 280,000 people in rural communities that lack access to modern energy services. 137 Projects approved for funding in the previous cycle have sponsored solar, hydropower, biomass, wind energy, and hybrid projects in Ecuador, the Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Samoa, and Sierra Leone. 138 Over the past few years, subsidies directed at promoting renewable energy have notably increased. 139 According to the IEA, increasing renewable subsidies to USD250 billion 140 could result in a range of positive outcomes; for instance, wind energy could become competitive by 2020 in the EU and by 2030 in China, 141 and up to 3.4 gigatons of energy-related CO 2 could be contained. 142 Arguably, any measure which promotes renewables would be beneficial for EU energy security. It is encouraging to observe that the EU captures 60 per cent of the global market share in wind energy. 143 If the EU manages to keep investing in renewables to maintain its privileged position in this particular energy sector, this could empower it to invest in technologies such as up-to-date energy grids and enable the export of cutting-edge technologies by means of trade and bilateral cooperation agreements. 144 In other words, the global increase in renewable energy in the total world energy mix is to be welcomed as this is a very dynamic and promising sector in which the EU already enjoys an advantaged position.
Were the global markets for renewable energy to experience such a surge, and the EU to effectively accomplish its ambitious goals in this field, 145 it is safe to say that the EU's influence in the international energy arena would grow. The EU enjoys technologically world-class companies that could greatly benefit from exporting vanguard renewable technologies, which are increasingly in vogue in countries that are major greenhouse gas emitters such as 137 Ibid. 138  China. 146 In short, while IRENA can directly shape neither public international nor EU law, its programmes and advocacy work to improve the conditions for pro-renewable regulation in both domains.

C. Multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs)
Alongside international organizations, transnational cooperation on renewable energy is also taking place through multi-stakeholder partnerships, both within and beyond the UN system. Multi-stakeholder partnerships emerged as a tool of governance at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). 147 Defined as 'collaborations between national or sub-national governments, private sector actors and civil society actors, who form voluntary transnational agreements in order to meet specific sustainable development goals', multi-stakeholder partnerships were introduced in the WSSD to complement rather than supplant intergovernmental agreements. 148 One such MSP is the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21 st Century (REN21), a self-described 'coalition of the willing' with the aim of facilitating a global transition to renewable energy. 149 REN21 is based within UNEP and its members include industry associations (eg the Clean Energy Council), international organizations (eg the International Energy Agency), NGOs (eg Greenpeace), science and academia, and national governments. 150 REN21 produces reports and organizes forums and conferences on renewable energy.
Other multi-stakeholder partnerships relevant to renewables include the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) Initiative, 151 153 The Technology Facilitation Mechanism has the broad remit of supporting the Sustainable Development Goals. It 'will be based on a multi-stakeholder collaboration between Member States, civil society, the private sector, the scientific community, United Nations entities and other partnerships were announced at the 2015 Paris climate change conference. One such, Mission Innovation, launched by twenty countries 154 and the Breakthrough Energy Coalition of major investors, 155 aims for each participating country to 'double its governmental and/or state-directed clean energy research and development investment over five years'. 156 These twenty countries aim to reinvigorate and accelerate clean energy innovation throughout the world to make clean energy affordable for all. The Breakthrough Energy Coalition partners commit to investing 'patient capital at unprecedented levels into earlystage technology development into participating countries'. 157 Multi-stakeholder partnerships have become established as a means of cooperation among United Nations System organizations and other entities on various elements of sustainable development, including low-emissions energy-rather serving as alternatives to 'traditional' international organizations. Research has identified significant limitations to the output of many multi-stakeholder partnerships, alongside proposals to improve partnership governance. 158 The processes of EU regulatory development and implementation-typically requiring input from multiple actors-create institutional competences that are transferable to work through MSPs. EU institutions have been active participants in relevant MSPs (eg the European Commission is a member of REN21 and is in the process of joining Mission Innovation). Indeed, MSPs can be seen as an example of the broader adoption of forms of multi-level governance innovated in the EU.

IV. Renewable energy: The Sustainable Development Goals and multilateral development banks
Renewables governance is not confined to international organizations and initiatives concerned primarily with climate change or energy. As energy is stakeholders and will be composed of a United Nations inter-agency task team on science, technology and innovation for the sustainable development goals, a collaborative multi-stakeholder forum on science, technology and innovation for the sustainable development goals and an online platform'. UNGA, 'Draft resolution submitted by the President of the inseparable from economic development more broadly, it is unsurprising that renewables increasingly feature in developmental targets and programmes. The promotion of renewable energy has become an increasingly prominent component of the global development agenda, both in response to the enduring challenge of energy poverty and as a component of strategies for developing countries to 'leapfrog' carbon-intensive phases of development. This increased prominence may be seen in the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in the practices of multilateral development banks and in the creation of new intergovernmental organizations such as the Global Green Growth Institute. 159 The SDGs were adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015 as the centrepiece of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 160 Like their predecessors, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the SDGs are a broad set of targets for the international community to meet over a fifteen-year period. The SDGs cannot compel states to act but can be expected to strongly influence policy and planning in many states, as well as guiding the activities of the UN development system and other organizations engaged in development work. While energy was not featured in the MDGs, 161 the SDGs include goals on both energy and climate change. SDG 7 is to '[e]nsure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all'. Target 7.2 encourages states to, '[b]y 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix'. Target 7.a calls on states to 'enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology, including renewable energy . . . and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology'. Unlike the MDGs, the SDGS apply universally, both to developed as well as developing countries. 162 Achieving the SDGs will therefore require domestic action, regional cooperation within the EU, in addition to development assistance from the EU to developing states. Support for renewables has also been integrated into development governance through the financing and other programmes of multilateral development banks. The World Bank Group has provided $21 billion for energy efficiency and renewable energy projects since 2010, out of a total of $49 billion in World Bank 159 Global Green Growth Institute, 'Overview' <http://gggi.org/about-gggi/background/organizational-overview/>. 160  Group energy financing. 163 Financing for renewable energy projects is also provided by regional development banks to their member states. 164 As with other international organizations, development banks have been prominent players in multi-stakeholder partnerships and other networks concerned with renewable energy. For example, the World Bank co-leads the SE4All Initiative. 165 Further support for renewables may be provided by the two development banks recently established by major emerging economies. In March 2013, the five 'BRICS' nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) agreed to establish a 'New Development Bank for mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries'. 166 In late 2015, India's Prime Minister reportedly stated that the New Development Bank would soon finance its first renewable energy project, 'preferably, in the territory of the BRICS'. 167 Moreover, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was established in 2014, as an initiative of the Chinese government and with fifty-seven 'Prospective Founding Members'. 168 The Bank's draft Environmental and Social Framework, released for consultation in 2015, states that the Bank 'aims to build upon existing green economic growth initiatives in Asia, and to provide support for new ones at the national and subnational level and within the private sector . . . [and] encourages renewable energy'. 169 These initiatives are indicative of the mainstreaming of climate change imperatives, including expanding the use of low-emissions energy sources, in development governance.
As renewable energy is one of the 17 SDGs, the role of multilateral development banks in helping achieve this goal is crucial.
V. High-level political steering on renewable energy: The G7 and G20 As climate change has become one of the highest-profile international challenges, renewable energy has been included on the agendas of multilateral leaders' meetings. 170 Arguably two of the most prominent such meetings are the Group of seven major industrialized economies (G7) and the Group of twenty major economies (G20). At their 2015 summit, G7 leaders called for 'decarbonisation of the global economy over the course of this century' and committed to 'developing and deploying innovative technologies striving for a transformation of the energy sectors by 2050', as well as to 'accelerat[ing] access to renewable energy in Africa and developing countries in other regions'. 171 The G20, which was upgraded to a heads of state and government meeting during the 2007-08 financial crisis, has also developed voluntary principles and programmes which promote renewables. 172 Ultimately, the common positions reached by the world's largest economies can influence subsequent negotiations between much larger groups of states. For example, the G7's June 2015 call for decarbonization during this century was followed by the 196-party UNFCCC COP's articulation of its aim 'to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century'. 173 Political leadership (be it in the context of the G7 or G20) will be necessary for renewable energy to gradually become a more prominent source of energy.

VI. International trade law and renewable energy
The trading system can help enhance sustainable energy and, therefore, decarbonize the economy. 174 Since time immemorial, trade has played a role in 170  So why not use trade law as a novel tool to mitigate climate change? Today, around 80% of the global energy supply comes from fossil fuels. 175 Fossil fuels contribute to climate change and are finite, which leads to energy insecurity. Renewable energy can help here in that it is cleaner than fossil fuels. It also helps towards energy independence and therefore enhances energy security. Trade law could be used as a vehicle to achieve this goal.
We stand to achieve considerable gains when trade law becomes a tool for change. Our hypothesis is that trade law can be a tool to help mitigate climate change and enhance energy security. 176 And it is well known that, thanks to trade, countries grow economically. Hence, the triple benefit of trade (see Figure  1). What is needed is to fill the theoretical and empirical gap for how trade law can help mitigate climate change. As a result of this knowledge gap, we have missed crucial opportunities for cooperation between trade and climate change. Let me give you an example.
In the 1990s, two major agreements were concluded (one on climate change-the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Changeand one on international trade-the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement). The WTO Agreement only briefly mentions in its preamble the importance of sustainable development in the context of international trade. I argue this was a missed opportunity for trade law to play a bigger role in mitigating climate change.
In 2015, a new global climate agreement came into existence-the Paris Agreement on Climate Change-which does not even mention the term 'trade.' These are examples of missed opportunities to cooperate between the trade and climate regimes.
Our vision is that we can use trade law as a vehicle not only for climate action and energy security, but for many of the sustainable development goals. Currently, the governance of trade and renewable energy is fragmented, with many institutions and legal instruments. There is insufficient research on how the trade and renewable energy regimes can cooperate.
Our hypothesis is that greater cooperation will lead to climate change mitigation and energy security. In this sense, identifying the gaps and opportunities for cooperation between these two regimes is crucial to have the basis for a new normative framework on how the trading system can help mitigate climate change and enhance energy security.
How can the trading system help? There are very few trade agreements with sustainable development chapters. Moreover, there is a lack of scholarship that can inform practice. Our hypothesis is that trade agreements can be a vehicle to address common concerns.
The concept of using the trading system to mitigate climate change and enhance energy security will transform our understanding of trade in the context of environmental protection. It will shift the current paradigm from trade as a major cause of environmental harm to trade as a tool for environmental protection.
The sections above concern bodies of international law, and international processes, which explicitly or implicitly promote renewable energy. It is also important to remember that renewables are subject to, and may be constrained by, other bodies of international law, such as trade law. 177 At least 18 per cent of trade between WTO members involves energy goods. 178 While there is no multilateral trade agreement specific to renewable energy, renewables are subject to the general principles of non-discrimination in trade, which are binding on the 164 members of the WTO. 179 WTO law requires states to abide by the nondiscrimination principles of most-favoured nation and national treatment. 180 A number of exceptions to the non-discrimination principles are provided in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other WTO Agreements. 181 Recent years have seen a number of WTO disputes in which states have alleged that WTO members have breached their WTO obligations by favouring domestic renewable energy firms. 182 As states continue to increase policy and financial support for renewables, often with the support of organizations and programmes discussed above, WTO and related trade disciplines have the potential to emerge as a key tension between international environmental and economic law. Unlike the WTO regime, there are elements of regional and 'mega-regional' trade agreements that specifically address renewable energy. An example is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was agreed in 2015 and covers twelve Pacific Rim states, which collectively account for almost 40 per cent of the global economy. 183 The environment chapter of the TPP calls for parties to cooperate on the 'development of cost-effective, low-emissions technologies and alternative, clean and renewable energy sources'. 184 VII. Renewable energy and the EU: The quest for clean and secure energy The EU's commitment to renewable energy is currently the most ambitious in any region of the world. The EU's approach to renewables and decarbonization is relevant to international renewable governance in that it serves as a pilot project and may lead the way in renewables. By doing so, renewables help enhance energy security and clean energy in the EU and beyond. 185 It is for this reason that we have chosen to include a section on the role that the EU plays regionally in clean and secure energy via renewable energy. The term renewable energy sources has been legally defined within the EU context. Its content is defined in the following EU Directives: The EU is the first region in the world to set up the ambitious target of decarbonizing its economy by 2050. It currently relies on energy-rich countries for its energy needs and urgently needs to diversify its energy supply, as illustrated by these two facts: 1. The EU imports 53 per cent of its energy; 190 and 2. Six EU countries depend 100 per cent on Russia for their gas. 191 The path towards decarbonization has already been chronologically delineated by the European Commission, through the 2020 Package, 192 the 2030  Ibid. 192 The 2020 climate and energy package aims to (1) reduce GHG emissions by 20 per cent from the 1990 levels, with binding national targets; (2) increase the share of EU energy consumption produced from renewable sources to 20 per cent, with binding national targets; and (3) increase Framework, 193 and the 2050 Roadmap. The objectives charted by the 2020 Package have so far been a success story in that not only have they prompted the EU to significantly curb GHG emissions, enhance energy efficiency, and foster the use of renewables, but they have also sustained the employment of more than 4.2 million people in various eco-industries 194 and constituted a key driver behind the 45 per cent growth of the European economy in real terms since 1990. 195 The Union is well on track, not only to hit its 2020 emissions and renewable targets, but to surpass them fairly easily, whilst it should come close to its efficiency goal. 196 But the great expectations arising from this triumphant climate and energy package have been strongly tempered by the growing uncertainties spawned by the new 2030 Framework for climate and energy policies. Table 1 compares the three decarbonization deadlines (2020, 2030, and 2050) against the three indicators (GHG emissions reduction, energy efficiency, and renewable energy).
Therefore, regarding the reduction of GHG emissions, the 2030 Framework is more ambitious than the 2020 Package. The energy efficiency target under the 2030 Framework is more daring (27 per cent) in comparison with the 20 per cent advocated under the 2020 Package. Nonetheless, it is arguably more flexible in that, not only do national objectives continue to be non-binding, but even the EU target has become 'indicative', whereas, under the 2020 Package, it was binding at the EU level. As for the renewable energy target, it is more assertive under the 2030 Framework (27 per cent) in comparison with the 20 per cent advocated under the 2020 Package. That said, it is looser in that, although the EU target remains binding, the national objectives have regressed to become merely voluntary, whereas, under the 2020 Package, they were binding.
Renewable energy has over the years become an increasingly vital requisite when countries, especially in the EU context, consider their energy securities. The reason for this are the traditionally high oil and gas prices as well as political instability in some energy-rich and energy-transit countries, as witnessed, for energy efficiency to save 20 per cent of EU energy consumption, with non-binding national objectives, all by 2020. See <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm>. The 2020 climate and energy Package does not address the energy efficiency target directly. This is done through the 2011 energy efficiency plan and the energy efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU of 25 October 2012. 193 The 2030 Framework for climate and energy policies sets (1) a binding EU target of at least 40 per cent cut in GHG emissions below the 1990 level, with binding national objectives; (2) a binding EU target of at least 27 per cent in renewable energy, but non-binding national objectives; and (3) an indicative energy efficiency target of at least 27 per cent, with non-binding national objectives, all by 2030. See <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/2030/index_en.htm> and the Conclusions of the European Council of 24 October 2014 (at 4-5), available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145397.pdf>. 194 Eurostat, 'Environmental goods and services sector' <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statis-tics_explained/index.php/Environmental_goods_and_services_sector>. 195 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: a policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030, p. 2, COM(2014) 15 final (22 January 2014). 196 Ibid. example, in the 2006, 2009, and, more recently, 2014 natural gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine. 197 These disagreements have had a negative impact on the EU, as the Russian pipelines that deliver natural gas to the EU run through Ukraine. 198 As a result, when Russia stops the natural gas flow to the Ukraine, it in effect stops it being distributed to the EU. This situation would be a motive to consider other methods to enhance EU energy security.
There are many prospective benefits, motives and aims that can be achieved through the use of renewable energy. Reasons why renewables ought to be encouraged include 'a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, the diversification of energy supplies and a reduced dependency on fossil fuel markets (in particular, oil and gas)'. 199 In addition, the progression of such sources could possibly stimulate employment in the EU, through the creation of jobs in new green technologies. 200 Regarding renewable energy in the EU, it is worth evaluating it as an additional (and gradually alternative) mechanism to fossil fuels to enhance energy security and the 2009 Renewables Directive.

A. Promotion of renewable energy
Beyond the creation of oil and gas pipelines, an additional way to enhance EU energy security would be through renewable energy, which is currently an expensive option. The resources certainly exist: Southern Europe is blessed with sunlight, whilst much wind could be utilized in Northern Europe. Therefore, the challenge is to render renewables more enticing. The EU should explore renewables as a long-term mechanism to achieve energy security and subsidies should go to this industry to make it cost-effective.
In January 2014, the European Commission delivered a communication laying out its proposed energy and climate objectives for 2030, including the promotion of renewable energy. 201 The new policy framework sets the target of a 27 per cent rise in the share of renewables in the EU's final energy consumption by 2030. Indeed, by solely persisting with the current policies, the share of renewables is expected to account for 24 per cent of the total energy consumption by 2030. 202 As far as the promotion of renewables is concerned, this positive trend is particularly remarkable, with a further and steady rise expected in the coming years. These conspicuous efforts illustrate the EU's yearning to carve for itself a role as a distinct leader in the field of renewables in an attempt to blaze the path and to spur other sizeable energy actors, such as the USA or China, 203 to follow suit to reduce GHG emissions worldwide. 204 Taking into account the far-reaching advancements that have taken place in Europe in the promotion of renewable energy over the last few years, together with the scientific community's clamour to swiftly tackle climate change, one may wonder why the European Commission would establish such a relatively moderate target for a, seemingly, decisive juncture. This decision is all the more regrettable inasmuch as it reflects the EU Member States' lack of eagerness to embark in a more daring enterprise and in that it undermines investors' confidence in the EU's engagement in its energy and climate goals. 205 However, the unbounded intensification of the use of renewables could entail unexpected and adverse repercussions on the energy market, thereby explaining the European Commission's cautious approach to the matter.
The new 2030 regime will, in the European Commission's mind, display some revolutionary features and call for a novel structure of European energy governance. 206 More concretely, the advocated system will be binding exclusively at the EU level (in contrast with the current regime, where national targets are binding) through the collective involvement of EU Member States, thus bestowing on them a greater resilience to meet their energy commitments in accordance with their individual circumstances, energy mixes, and capacity to produce renewable energy. 207 Regarding the necessary guidance for this advocated model of energy governance to come to fruition, the European Commission envisaged itself as the ultimate monitor, with the necessary powers to appraise and, where necessary, suggest amendments to EU Member States' national policies on emissions reduction, energy efficiency as well as renewable energy. 208 Unsurprisingly, the suggestion was, to say the least, received with mild enthusiasm by EU Member States, which merely went as far as to concede that 'a reliable and transparent governance system without any unnecessary administrative burden will be developed to help ensure that the EU meets its energy policy goals, with the necessary flexibility for member states and fully respecting their freedom to determine their energy mix'. 209 In 2014, up to 23.5 per cent of the electricity produced in the EU and 14 per cent of final energy consumption over all sectors emanated from renewable energies. 210 As renewables break through into the energy mixes of EU members states, new challenges arise: the volatility and unpredictability inherently tied with, for instance, solar and wind energy renders the task of stabilizing the grid all the more burdensome. 211 This has incited EU Member States to employ national subsidies as a means to warrant conventional, fossil-fuel generators in order to provide back-ups, should the winds drop or the sky cloud over. 212 Consequentially, the fraction of non-subsidized electricity in the market is dwindling as renewables make their way, to such an extent that competitive markets are becoming a minor part of the total market. 213 This unsuspected twist constitutes a growing concern for the European Commission, as the supposedly complementary efforts to complete the European internal energy market and to foster renewable energy appear to actually clash.
The European Commission is seeking to foster the use of renewable energy whilst attempting to encourage a more harmonized European approach to these clean sources of energy, as well as to capacity mechanisms, as a means to provide a level playing field for competition. 214 Thus, the challenge that lies ahead on this front is not so much the maximization of the share of renewables per se (which should be fairly easily achieved), but rather the task of making sure to reduce as much as possible the trade and investment distortions that the prospected surge in the use of renewables could entail. To adequately tackle this divergence, the EU will have to press for the waning of the differences between the twenty-eight national schemes and the effective fusion of energy markets throughout the EU.
In that sense, the European Commission suggested guidelines for the design of national support schemes for renewable energy in late 2013. 215 This guidance addresses three main issues. First, there is a need to keep the costs low by swiftly and transparently revising tariffs on a regular basis to equate them with falling technology costs. 216 This will thwart retroactive cutbacks in subsidies that undermine the confidence of investors in the renewable sector. 217 Secondly, market integration is vital. Renewable energy producers need to be more exposed to market prices in order to allow competition, which should become the ultimate drive leading to the most adequate and cost-effective energy production and investment decisions. 218 Finally, and in accordance with the prescriptions laid down by the renewables directive, 219 the Europeanization of support for renewables is a prime concern. In that sense, EU Member States will be urged to boost intra-EU trade and cooperation in the renewable energy field and, where possible, to blend their supporting schemes on a regional basis, 220 very much in the same way advocated for energy markets in general.
In sum, the promotion of renewables per se has a clear path ahead. Harnessing the market and investment disruptions, resulting from their rampant hike, through the convergence of national supporting schemes seems to be the real challenge. Orchestrating complementary State interventions across Europe will assuredly be a formidable enterprise. That said, one may be optimistic in that the guidelines and directives enacted for that purpose provide a solid framework to solve these distortions, thereby empowering the unbridled promotion of renewable energy in the coming years.

B. The Renewables Directive
This section analyzes how the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive (RED) 221 could be an effective tool to move towards greater energy independence and create a well-functioning and competitive market capable of promoting a growing use of renewable energy. Furthermore, without its effective implementation, private investors might lose confidence, which would hinder the future development of the renewables market.

(i) Potential for energy independence
The RED establishes a common framework aimed at promoting renewable energy across Europe and envisages, inter alia, the following provisions: 1. Mandatory national targets to be achieved in 2020 by each EU Member State, both for the share of energy from renewable sources in gross final consumption so as to enable the EU to get 20 per cent of its overall energy consumption from renewable energy by 2020, 222 and for the share of energy from renewable sources in all forms of transport (ie at least 10 per cent of the final consumption of energy in transport in each EU Member State). 223 2. Support schemes to help EU Member States reach their targets-eg any instrument applied by an EU Member State or a group of EU Member States that encourages the use of renewable energy by reducing the cost of that energy, raising the price at which it can be sold, or intensifying the volume of the energy purchased, including investment aid, tax exemptions or reductions, tax refunds, feed-in tariffs, and premium payments. 224 3. Information on support schemes to be made available to all relevant actorseg 'consumers, builders, installers, architects, and suppliers of heating, cooling and electricity equipment and systems and of vehicles' compatible with the use of renewable energy. 225 4. Three cost-effective and cooperative mechanisms, resembling the flexible mechanisms provided in the Kyoto Protocol, that can be used by EU (b) setting up and making public their standard rules regarding the 'bearing and sharing of costs of technical adaptations, such as grid connections and reinforcements,' which are necessary to integrate new renewable energy producers in the grid; 235 (c) bearing, in full or in part, the costs of technical adaptations, whether EU Member States require them to do so; 236 (d) providing any renewable energy producer wishing to have access to the system with the relevant information required; 237 and (e) charging transmission and distribution tariffs, which will reflect realizable cost benefits resulting from the renewable energy plant's connection to the grid and will not discriminate against gas from renewable energy. 238 By setting up a common legal framework for renewable and providing for, inter alia, the above-mentioned provisions, the EU should be able to both promote an increasing use of renewable energy across Europe and move towards greater energy independence. First, promoting renewable energy in the EU means that the following outcomes should be reached in Europe, but also beyond its borders: reducing GHG emissions by mitigating the impact of EU energy needs on the climate; growth of renewable energy-related demand, market, and investments through all the aforesaid measures (eg binding targets, support schemes, and the legal stability and certainty provided by National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs)), which represent the basic requirements to increase the competitiveness of the market and the confidence of economic operators in the system; and making renewable energy increasingly economically viable, thanks to the growth of renewable energy-related demand, market, and investments, which should stimulate research, development, and innovation regarding more efficient, cost-effective, and competitive renewable energy technologies.
Second, the RED is fostering greater energy independence in Europe, as it especially encourages the achievement of two of the eight European Energy Security Strategy (EESS) fundamental objectives: diversifying external supplies and related infrastructures; and increasing EU energy production. 239 235 RED, Art. 16(3). 236 RED, Art. 16(4). 237 RED, Art. 16(5). 238 RED, Art. 16(7)-(8). 239 The eight pillars of the EESS are: immediate actions aimed at increasing the EU's capacity to overcome a major disruption during the winter 2014/2015; strengthening emergency/solidarity mechanisms including coordination of risk assessments and contingency plans; and protecting Whereas the Directive facilitates the diversification of energy supplies from abroad and their transmission systems, principally through the provisions on joint projects between EU Member States and third countries and on the appropriate actions to be taken by Member States to develop transmission infrastructures between Member States and third countries, 240 it also supports the growth of energy production in the EU by introducing national mandatory targets. 241 Interestingly, EU primary production of renewable energy has indeed increased by almost 29 per cent between 2008 and 2012, compared with a lesser increase of approximately 24 per cent in the period 2004-08 (ie before the adoption of the binding targets), 242 while overall EU energy production (renewable energy production included) has declined by almost 15 per cent in the period 2000-12. 243 Taking into consideration that the overall EU-28 energy production shrank from 810.5 million tons of oil equivalent in 2012 to 804.2 million tons of oil equivalent in 2013, this appears to be a constant negative trend. 244 However, the European Commission has pointed out various reasons for concern about the effective enforcement of the RED and, thus, on its future progress and achievements, some of which undermine private investors' confidence and the proper functioning of the renewable energy market. 245 Among these problems are: the slow implementation of the Directive, which hinders the promotion of renewable energy and the move towards greater energy independence and has forced the Commission to start infringement procedures against strategic infrastructure; moderating energy demand; building a well-functioning and fully integrated internal market; increasing energy production in the EU; further developing energy technologies; diversifying external supplies and related infrastructure; and improving coordination of national energy policies and speaking with one voice in external energy policy. See European Energy Security Strategy, p. 3. 240 RED, Arts 9-10, 16(1). 241 National targets refer to gross final consumption, and not to domestic production, for two main reasons: to help Member States reach their targets more easily, by making improvements in energy efficiency and thus lowering their energy consumption; and to allow Member States to use cooperation mechanisms so as to achieve their targets in a more cost-effective way, by counting within their targets an amount of RE produced in other Member States or third countries. But, even though national targets refer to final consumption, since both energy savings with regard to final energy consumption have declined by approximately 6 per cent in the period 2008-12, and almost no cooperation mechanisms have occurred, Member States are primarily fostering a growth of national production of renewable energy. See NREAPs and changes to their national support schemes, which reduce the legal clarity and stability needed by private investors and increase their exposure to regulatory risks; administrative burdens and delays that still cause barriers and problems to the uptake of renewable energy, raising risks for renewable energy projects and investments; slow infrastructure and transmission developments, delays in connection, and grid operational rules that disadvantage renewable energy producers and lessen the encouragement of true and fair competition.
Moreover, the main purpose of a framework that includes renewable energy mandatory targets is to provide the business community with the long-term stability and legal predictability it needs to make confident and rational investments in the renewable energy sector, which will, in turn, boost the use of renewable energy and its related market, make renewable energy more economically viable, mitigate climate change, reduce energy dependence, and encourage an ongoing development of renewable energy technologies. Therefore, the EU institutions should act as soon as possible to complete the necessary legislative procedure to make the proposed renewable energy objective for the period up to 2030 (ie 27 per cent of RE share in the EU's gross final consumption) a binding target 247 now that the European Council has finally agreed on it. 248 This view is shared by a group of sixty-one EU companies and associations that, in September 2013, issued a letter to the EU institutions calling for renewable energy binding targets for the period 2020-30. The letter states: Given the long investment cycles in the energy sector and the fact that investment decisions in the EU's liberalised energy markets strongly depend on reliability, certainty about the regulatory framework of the next 17 years is needed. Such a framework bears the opportunity to reduce the current costs of uncertainty, mobilise the needed funding, help to protect the environment, decrease the costs of decarbonisation, facilitate the creation of new jobs and enhance the EU's technology leadership. 249 Therefore, only once all EU Member States have rigorously and comprehensively implemented the RED, its provisions being enforced with no deviations that can frustrate the market, and the proposed targets up to 2030  binding, can the EU 'expect the renewable energy industry to be a thriving, mature and globally competitive one in the lead up to 2020 and beyond'. 250 Moreover, only then will the EU finally be able to effectively promote renewable energy across Europe and outside its borders and to move towards greater energy security.
(ii) Encouraging trade in renewable energy goods and services It has been the goal of the European Commission for many years now to encourage the use of renewable energy within the EU. 251 However, what seems to be the case is that this is being done in an internal way (between EU Member States), rather than reaching out to conclude renewable energyrelated agreements with other countries and regions. Some examples of EU legal instruments related to renewable energy include: highest target of 49 per cent, up from 39.8 per cent in 2005, 258 and Malta had the lowest, at 10 per cent up from zero in 2005. 259 If EU Member States do not fulfil their assigned objective, they are subject to enforcement action by the European Commission for failure to comply.
There are downsides, however, to such long-term targets. The shortcomings are that they postpone official judgement and compliance to the target date, in the case of Directive 2009/28/EC and the 20-20-20 by 2020 policy it sets out. 260 Until now, however, EU Member States do not have free reign 261 and are scrutinized for any decisions that may 'seriously compromise the attainment of the result set out in the 2009/28/EC directive'. 262 In order for Member States to show progress, they are required to submit a National Renewable Energy Action Plan that must set out that the state has or is going to take 'adequate measures' to achieve its national goal. 263 Some commentators argue what is essential for the transition to a green economy is continuous debate and scrutiny of the topic. 264 One such influence is the Rio+20 conference, 265 which provides for specific networks to support future discussions on trade as well as the green economy by producing more knowledge, experience sharing, and informed discussions between countries and regional bodies. 266 In particular, it sets out the fact that it is essential that the apprehensions of developing countries are addressed in these processes. One proposal is to establish an international knowledge-sharing platform that all countries can access to facilitate green policy formation and implementation. 267 Finally, there is a suggested Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement initiative that could contribute by speeding up the 'development and adoption of renewable energy and clean technology globally'. 268 The effort by the EU to promote renewable sources through Directives is a positive step in the right direction. This is further heightened by the fact that trade in renewable energy goods and services can transpire between both EU Member States as well as with third parties. This is set out in Article 1 of the 2009/28/EC Directive, which states that the Directive 'lays down rules relating to statistical transfers between Member States, joint projects between Member States and with third countries . . .'. By looking beyond the EU, better alternatives and opportunities for both economic and political growth and harmony may be found.

(iii) Trading with third parties
Trading with third parties will potentially allow the EU economy to develop at a greater pace and perhaps move towards becoming a green economy. The consent, however, of the EU entering into an agreement with a third country does have its limitations, as doing so is surrounded by measures that have to be complied with. These measures require positive action to be taken by both parties. One such example is Article 18(4) of the 2009/28/EC Directive, by which EU Member States ought to consider whether the third country they wish to enter into an agreement with is suitable. Article 18(4) sets out that, in order for any initial agreement to be made between the parties, the third country will have to have a set of criteria with regard to sustainable energy that complies with those of Directive 2009/28/EC. This ensures that the third State has the same obligations to comply with and safeguards all EU Member States from any damage that could otherwise emerge from the agreement.
Obligations on the EU Member State are set out throughout the other recitals, for example in 38, 39, and 74 of the 2009/28/EC Directive. These three points have requirements that need to be satisfied in order for the Member State to be able to engage with any third country and proceed with a trade agreement. Some of the restrictions include that EU Member States can only undertake projects with third countries where there are 'newly constructed installations or . . . installations with newly increased capacity' 269 for the production of renewable energies.
Another matter is the production of biofuels and bio liquids, where the concern is that third countries might have different standards when manufacturing them. 270 This could result in minimum environmental as well as social requirements not being met by the third country. This would create a problem because, by not meeting the minimum standards, the use and production of renewables may be reduced. Fundamentally, these restrictions are in place so that the EU is protected, making the most out of possible agreements, benefiting the EU and its economy, rather than taking away from possible work and sources that can be provided from within the EU. The third countries' interests are also taken into consideration. installations is done in order to 'help ensure that the proportion of energy from renewable sources in the third country's total energy consumption is not reduced due to the importation of energy from renewable sources into the Community'. 271 Ultimately, there exists significant scope for EU regulation concerning trade in renewables to directly influence the development of international law, through the conclusion of trade and investment agreements between the EU (and its Member States), on the European side, and third parties.

VIII. Conclusion
The governance of renewables is diffused, which means that there is a lack of coordination (both normative and institutional) in renewables. International and European renewable energy governance is the product of a diverse constellation of international and supranational organizations, partnerships, and bodies of public international law and EU law. It is a mix of national and supranational hard law and international soft law measures. In addition to the UNFCCC and the constraining disciplines of WTO law, renewables governance draws on a 'plethora' of soft law instruments relating to renewables specifically or international environmental law generally. 272 As Bruce has observed, '[o]ne reason for the widespread adoption of soft law is its lack of enforcement machinery. Repeated application of norms over time can engender a de facto regulatory status or probationary testing before incorporation into treaty law'. 273 The combined outcomes of efforts to expand renewable energy's role in the global economy should be put into perspective. According to the IEA, renewables accounted for over 45 per cent of newly added world power generation capacity in 2014. 274 In 2014, global energy-related CO 2 emissions remained unchanged at around 32.2 Gt, despite the world economy growing by some 3 per cent, figures that indicate 'a decoupling between energy-related emissions and economic growth in some parts of the world'. 275 274 Of the estimated 128 GW increase in renewable power generation capacity in 2014, 37 per cent was accounted for by wind power, almost one-third by solar and over a quarter by hydropower. International Energy Agency, Energy and Climate Change: World Energy Outlook Special Report (OECD/IEA, 2015), 21. 275 Ibid 30. of 1.8 per cent. 276 However, fossil fuels continue to meet over 80 per cent of total primary energy demand. 277 The broad array of activity concerning renewables in European and international law and international organizations, surveyed above, prompts a number of questions for further legal research. An area that deserves further investigation is the extent of the reception of international normative and regulatory innovations in domestic law, either through direct programmatic intervention or otherwise. Another relationship to be explored is the nature of feedbacks between public international law/EU law and international organizations concerned with renewable energy and the development of a private international law of renewables, for example concerning project finance or technology transfer. At the international level, the determining factors behind, on the one side, fragmentation of international legal initiatives concerning renewables and, on the other, networking between different action streams are of pressing concern to policy makers, as is the potential for broader networks of public, private, and hybrid actors to act as force multipliers of the UNFCCC and other bodies of public international law concerned with renewable energy. Furthermore, the coalescing of any customary law concerning renewables may also merit consideration. Finally, as renewable energy engages multiple areas of European and international law, tensions with international biodiversity and human rights law 278 open other avenues for legal research, as the international community continues to explore legal and regulatory innovation concerning renewables in grappling with pressing climate change and energy challenges.
Ultimately, the diverse international institutions and treaties which bear on the governance of renewable energy present multiple opportunities for the EU to influence the development of public international law, both through the example and functioning of EU law and through broader EU diplomacy. Innovations such as the role of Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change hold out the prospect of deepening the interplay between EU and international law. As both an established normative leader on climate change and a vast market for, and innovator in, energy, the EU is well placed to exert a beneficial influence on the development of international renewable energy governance. 276 Ibid 29. 277 Ibid 25. 278 Consider, for instance, threats to migratory species posed by wind power structures (CMS Resolution 7.5, 'Wind Turbines and Migratory Species') and the forced displacement of indigenous peoples due to hydropower projects (Saramaka People v Suriname (Judgment) (28 November 2007) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 172).